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INTRODUCTION

People v. Simpson' led many citizens to believe that what they saw on
television is how most criminal proceedings take place. Many viewers
who watched the trial attained what they perceived as detailed insights
into the mechanism known as the criminal trial. One misperception
many viewers developed is that all criminal defendants benefit from
similar zealous representation.2 The Simpson case, however, was far
from representative of the norm.'
The Simpson case revealed the contradiction between an ideal and
reality.4 The ideal is an adversarial system that determines truth
through the advocacy of both parties. "The very premise of our
adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan advocacy on both
sides of a case will best promote the ultimate objective that the guilty
be convicted and the innocent go free."5 The right to counsel as
provided for by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution is fundamental to realizing this ideal.6 A criminal defendant
cannot realistically hope to defend himself and his constitutional rights
without the aid of an attorney.7 Thus, without effective assistance of

1. People v. Simpson, No. BA097211 (Sup. Ct. LA County 1995).
2. Elizabeth Gleick, Rich Justice, PoorJustice; Did We Need O.J. to Remind Us That
Money Makes All the Difference-In the Trial and in the Verdict?, TIME, June 19, 1995, at 40.
3. Id. The amount of money spent by O.J. on his defense demonstrates the
uniqueness of his case. Simpson "spent $5 million to $6 million by the end of the trial."
Id.; see also Barbara Babcock, EqualJustice-anda Defendant With the Money to Exercise Every
Right, LA TIMES, July 10, 1994, at A26 (citing the fact that Simpson's attorneys
"assembled a team of half a dozen lawyers plus forensic pathologists, criminal
investigators, analysts and paralegals.. ."); Alan Abrahamson, Simpson Legal Fees Could
Run Into Millions, LA TIMES, July 9, 1994, at Al (quoting a defense attorney as stating
that if prosecution will not spare any expense then neither will the defendant).
4. See Babcock, supra note 3, at A26.
5. Rodger Citron, Note, (Un)Luckey v. Miller: The Casefor a StructuralInjunction to
Improve Indigent Defense Services, 101 YALE LJ. 481, 481 (Nov. 1991) (citing Herring v.
New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975)).
6. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984) (citing Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963)).
7. Id. at 653. The presence of an attorney "is essential because they are the means
through which the other rights of the person on trial are secured." Id.
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counsel an ideal adversarial criminal justice system cannot exist.8
The Sixth Amendment, however, did not articulate precisely how a
poor person was to exercise his or her right to an attorney when he or
she could not afford one. The Supreme Court responded to this
dilemma when it held, in the renowned case of Gideon v. Wainwright,9
that the state must provide the indigent defendant with counsel to
guarantee the defendant's right to due process. Since the Gideon
ruling, the criminal justice system has repeatedly tried to figure out
how to provide the assistance of counsel both effectively and economically. Despite the system's efforts to balance these competing interests,
there is little doubt that for the most part, the system is failing.
In the past, Minnesota's response to Gideon's mandate has been
somewhat successful.10 Yet, Minnesota's success quickly dissipated as
the 1990s progressed." Significant changes in the law, the complexity
of charges, and the number of indigent criminal defendants have
placed the current indigent defense mechanism in jeopardy. 2 In
light of recent statutory changes, the increasing number of indigent
defendants, and the impending threat of federal spending cuts,1 it is

8. Id. at 653-54. The Court notes that "if the process loses its character as a
confrontation between adversaries [in the adversarial criminal trial], the constitutional
guarantee is violated." Id. at 656-57.
9. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
10. See Elaine Song, Better Than Some, Worse Than Others; The CCLU Charges in Its
Recent Suit That the State's Public-Defender System Is in Crisis. Here's How Connecticut
Compares With Other State Systems, CONN. LAW. TRiB., Jan. 16, 1995, 1 (citing Wisconsin
and Minnesota as examples from which Connecticut could learn how to administer a
public defense system).
11. See THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY FOR THE STATE OF
MINNESOTA BOARD OF PUBLIC DEFENSE-DRAF " REPORT 18-20 (1991) [hereinafter
SPANGENBERG DRAFT REPORT] (on file with author and State Board of Public Defense).
12. See id. at 20-21.
13. See Brad Hayward, Controller Takes Finger Off 'Trigger'--Budget Cuts Avoided,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Oct. 17, 1995, at AS. All states are uncertain as to what impact
federal cutbacks will have on state programs. For example, "California can expect to
get $510 million less in federal aid for welfare and immigration than it budgeted
for.., and its long-term financial picture will be complicated by changes in federal
welfare policy and the impact of the 'three strikes and you're out' sentencing law." Id.
(quoting Kathleen Connell, state controller).
As for Minnesota, it "stands to lose about $265 million ... in mid-year cuts under
a bill passed by Congress, and an estimated $171 million under the Senate plan .... "
Jean Hopfensperger, State GroupsMonitoring Changes That Could Come As Soon As Summer,
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 10, 1995, at Al. The threat of federal cutbacks are also
visible at the municipal level. See Ann Baker, Cities Share Federal Budget-Cut Fears, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Nov. 29, 1995, at B2 (noting that city officials from St. Paul,
Minnesota, Toledo, Ohio and Louisville, Kentucky, all acknowledge that they "expect
to feel the brunt of expected new federal spending caps in health and welfare areas that
may not reflect inflationary costs and growth in populations of the poor, disabled and
elderly."); see also Kevin Diaz, Sayles Belton Outlines Cuts in Preliminary 1996 Budget, STAR
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clear that Minnesota's public defender system needed to act. So it did
in the case of Kennedy v. Carlson. 4
This Commentary asserts that the Minnesota Supreme Court
abrogated the court's duty to protect the rights of the poor and to
preserve the integrity of the adversarial system when it held that
Minnesota constitutionally finances its public defense system. The
court should have communicated to the legislature that the method
currently employed is constitutionally defective. Instead, the supreme
court deferred to the other government branches' assessment of what
constitutes adequate financial support for the defense of the indigent.
Furthermore, the court should have more thoroughly scrutinized the
current state of affairs. If the court had conducted a more thorough
analysis of the situation at hand, it would have seen how close the
current system teaters near the brink of disintegration. This Commentary concludes that the Minnesota Supreme Court failed to recognize
that it must act now to preserve the indigent defendant's right to
effective representation.
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court must become much
more critical when assessing whether indigent defendants receive
quality representation. The supreme court must place the other
branches of government on notice that it will not tolerate the abrogation of the constitutional rights of the poor. The court can communicate this message by demonstrating a willingness to overturn the
conviction of an indigent defendant when the representation hints at
being subpar. Thus, only additional funding and adequate judicial
support can adequately transform Minnesota's public defender system
into one that provides effective legal assistance to the poor criminal
defendant.
Part I of this Commentary outlines the origins and the development
of the indigent defendant's right to counsel. Part II describes the
various types of indigent defense systems15 currently used in the
United States, as well as the particular program implemented in
Minnesota. Part III looks at the current state of indigent defense
systems, and notes that changing criminal sentencing statutes, rigorous
drug enforcement efforts, and inadequate funding continually batter
TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 16, 1995, at Al (noting uncertainties associated with federal
cutbacks may result in a six million dollar budget shortfall); Sharon Schmickle,
Minnesotans See Federal Budget Cuts Hitting Home, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 31,

1995, at Al (reporting that " [e] ven before the decisions are final, programs such as one
that was to fund jobs this summer for 2,500 young people in Hennepin County and
thousands elsewhere have been disrupted ...
14. 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
15. Although there are three model indigent defense programs, this Commentary
will use "public defender" when it refers to Minnesota's indigent defense system, since
Minnesota currently uses a public defender model program.
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and bruise a system which already operates under unrealistic government expectations. Part IV reviews the events leading to Kennedy v.
Carlson, each parties' arguments, and both the trial court and
Minnesota Supreme Court's order and reasonings.
Finally, Part V criticizes the Minnesota Supreme Court's failure to
agree with the trial court's conclusions. It presents a case for how the
supreme court should commence the reformation process of the
current public defender system. The Minnesota Supreme Court is
capable of initiating this process by taking a firm position against
permitting such abuses to continue, and crafting a remedy to compel
the legislature to evaluate and amend Minnesota's indigent defense
system. This Commentary concludes that only a remedy which forces
the other branches of government to alter the current state of indigent
defense will suffice.
II.

THE RIGHT TO CoUNsEL: WHERE DID IT
COME FROM AND WHY IS IT HERE?

A.

Priorto the Twentieth Century
The right to counsel, as laid out in the Sixth Amendment to the6
United States Constitution, has its roots in English jurisprudence.'
The right to use the services of an attorney in a criminal case first
appeared in England during the twelfth century. 7 At that time, the
English government allowed defendants to secure counsel in all civil
and misdemeanor cases.' 8 The royal government limited the role of
counsel to these situations since the crown, due to its perception that
it was always vulnerable to attack, sought to preserve any advantage it
had over its enemies.' 9
After the Revolution of 1688, in which the English Government
became more stable, the crown still viewed itself as relatively weak.2"2
The crown, therefore, continued to protect itself from its enemies. '
Even after the Treason Act of 1695 led to criminal procedure reforms,
only defendants charged with either misdemeanors or treason

16. ALFREDO GARCIA, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT IN MODERN AMERICANJURISPRUDENCE:
A CRITIcAL PERSPECTIVE 3 (1992).
17. ROBERT ALLEN RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1776-1791, at 5-6
(1991).
The Statute of Merton, enacted in 1236, exemplifies one of the first

governmental grants of this privilege. Id.
18.
UNITED
19.
20.
21.

FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION TO THE
STATES 9-10 (1969).
Id. at 10.
GARCIA, supra note 16, at 3.
HELLER, supra note 18, at 10.
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possessed the right to counsel.22
It is of little surprise that the early American colonists, like the
English, attempted to limit the role of lawyers in society. The role of
the lawyer was minimal for three reasons. First, some colonists viewed
English law as oppressive and did not wish to promulgate it.23 Second,
the clergy and land-owning aristocracies viewed "lawyers as a threat to
their respective power and status."2 4 Finally, the English government
resolved that those individuals who established the American colonies
under English grants had to adopt English law.25 For example, the
first Virginia charter issued underJames I in 1606 included a covenant
which expressed that all colonists shall have the same rights in the New
World as they possessed in England. 6 When the colonies adopted
English law they also adopted English common law procedure. Thus,
just as it was in England, the early colonists' "key protection from
government arbitrariness and oppression was not the right to counsel
but the right to trial."27
Over time, however, the colonists began to recognize the importance
of the right to counsel. One reason for this change was America's use
of "the inquisitorial institution of the public prosecutor."2 1 Inevitably,
as public prosecutors became more experienced with criminal
procedure and the law's idiosyncrasies, it became increasingly difficult
for the layperson to represent himself.29 Another reason the legal
profession began to flourish in the New World was that the colonies
discarded English common law.30 As a result, legal codes and courts

22. GARCIA, supra note 16, at 3. The Treason Act of 1695 also enacted many
reforms of which the most important was the right to notice and compulsory process.
Id. "And not until 1836 was the privilege of counsel extended to persons accused of
felonies other than treason." HELLER, supra note 18, at 10.
23. William F. McDonald, In Defense of Inequality: The Legal Profession and Criminal
Defense, in THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 20 (1983).

"The hostility toward lawyers as a class

generated during the Puritan Revolution in England was exaggerated in the colonies."
Id.
24. Id. at 21. This seems to have been a legitimate concern of both groups.
Lawyers and the aristocracy competed for power with each other for many years in
Virginia. Lawyers threatened the clergy because "they were the men of learning in their
communities." Thus, lawyers jeopardized their supremacy before the tribunals. Id.
Furthermore, the religious temperament of the first colonists also limited the role of
lawyers in the New World. For example, the first leaders in Massachusetts "were overly
zealous in their efforts to prevent and suppress any manifestation of independence in
religious or political matters." 1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IN AMERICA: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE 56 (1965).

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.

CHROUsT, supra note 24,at 56.
HELLER, supra note 18, at 14.
McDonald, supra note 23, at 21.
GARCIA, supra note 16, at 4.
GARCIA, supra note 16, at 4.
CHROUST, supra note 24, at 56-57.
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developed that were unique to the colonies.5 '
These legal transformations, therefore, led laypersons to seek out
32
those individuals who were familiar with the quickly developing law.
"Despite the strong antilawyer sentiments, provisions were made in
some colonies for a right to counsel; in practice, in some places
counsel were appointed in needy cases even before such appointments
were required as a matter of law."33 The fact that most of the new
states, after the American Revolution, enacted some sort of statutory
or state constitutional provision regarding the right to counsel further
evidences the new appreciation for the value of lawyers. 34 Thus, an
attorney's assistance became essential to counter the prosecutor's
abilities and to help America craft its own system of law.
At the time the Federal Constitution was being drafted, many states
had guaranteed several criminal procedural rights in their own
constitutions. 3 "Accordingly, it was natural that opposition to the
Federal Constitution arose in part because of the procedural protections accorded the accused in state constitutions ...were conspicuously missing from the new document. " M To encourage the adoption of
'the Federal
Constitution, the Framers consequently added the Bill of
Rights. 37 The Bill of Rights included the Sixth Amendment which
states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and have the Assistance of Counsel for his

31. CHROUsT, supra note 24, at 56-57.
32. CHROUST, supra note 24, at 56-57.
33. McDonald, supra note 23, at 23. "In Connecticut, for instance, there was no
statutory provision for the appointment of counsel in criminal cases until 1818. Yet the
custom had been since 1750 to appoint counsel if the accused requested it." Id. The
colonies of Delaware, Virginia, Rhode Island, Georgia, Pennsylvania, and North Carolina
enacted provisions that mandated practices similar to those in Connecticut. See id. at
23-25.
34. McDonald, supra note 23, at 24. The first document protecting the right to
counsel was the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, § 29. This was also the first American
guaranty of the right to counsel. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND

199 (1977). Article 16 of the NewJersey Constitution was the first state constitutional
protection enacted. Id. It stated "[t]hat all criminals shall be admitted to the same
privilege of wimesses and counsel, as their prosecutors are or shall be entitled to...."
HELLER, supra note 18, at 22.
35. See HELLER, supra note 18, at 21-22.
36. GARCIA, supra note 16, at 4.
37.

EUGENE W. HICKOKJR., THE BILL OF RIGHTS 366 (1991).
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defence.'
Moreover, the right to the assistance of counsel did not mean the
right to appointed counsel.5 9 At the time the Sixth Amendment was
enacted, the right to the assistance of counsel meant only that an
accused person could retain an attorney at his or her own expense if
he or she wished to do so.'
The Sixth Amendment, however, says
nothing about how the poor are to secure the services of an attorney.4' Thus, although the development of the right to the assistance
of counsel progressed tremendously during the colonial period, it did
not extend to the poor
in America via the Sixth Amendment until the
42
Twentieth Century.
B.

The Sixth Amendment Reaches the Poor
The Sixth Amendment lay dormant for approximately 140 years,4"

38. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
39. HiCKOKJR., supra note 37, at 366.
40. See Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of "Counsel" in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOwA L. REv. 433, 439 (1993). The Sixth Amendment also moved America's
jurisprudence from English influence by eliminating laws that forced accused
individuals to represent themselves. Id. at 438-39.
41. HELLER, supranote 18, at 110. This interpretation of the Sixth Amendment is
inferable from the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Federal Crimes Act of 1790. Section
35 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 states that "in all courts of the United States, the parties
may plead and manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel
or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to
manage and conduct cases therein." Id. (citing Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73,
92). The Judiciary Act gave the criminal defendant the right to manage his or her
defense with the assistance of counsel at his or her discretion. Furthermore, the only
Congressional enactment expressly providing for counsel was the Federal Crimes Act
of 1790. It provided that the federal judiciary had to appoint counsel only in capital
cases. Id. (citing Act of Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 30, 1 Stat. 112, 119 (reenacted as § 1034,
Revised Statutes) and 18 U.S.C. § 503 (1940)).
42. HICKOKJR., supra note 37, at 367.
43. Charles W. Wolfram, Scottsboro Boys in 1991: The Promise of Adequate Criminal
Representation Through the Years, 1 CORNELLJ.L. & PUB. POLY 61, 62 (1992). Although
the Legal Aid movement began to evolve in the late 1800s, it limited the scope of its
assistance to civil litigation. The first organized office, tiled "public defenders," was
established in Oklahoma in 1911. The Los Angeles Public Defender Office came into
existence in 1912, and in 1914, became a department of the County of Los Angeles'
government. As America's urban populations bloomed with the numerous waves of
immigrants taking up residence in the United States, the assigned counsel systems that
existed previously could not manage the rigorous new demands of a flourishing low
income population. "The failure of the assigned counsel system to meet-particularly
in the great urban centers-the growing needs of the indigent defendant created an
environment in which new systems could evolve." SPECIAL COMMITr.E OF THE ASS'N OF
THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. AND THE NATIONAL LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N,
EQUAL JusTIcE FOR THE ACCUSED 44-46 (1959) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE
AccuSED].
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until the Supreme Court recognized the right to appointed counsel in
the infamous case of Powell v. Alabama." The facts of this case serve
as a prime example of justice at its worst. The defendants in Powell
were seven poor, uneducated African-American males from out of state
that were charged with raping two Caucasian women in the heart of
Alabama during the 1920s.4 s Counsel did not assist any of the seven
defendants during their one-day trials,46 nor was there any legitimate
attempt to provide them with an attorney.4 7 Not surprisingly, the jury
convicted all seven defendants and "the court imposed the death
sentences ... barely two weeks after the alleged offense.""

The

Supreme Court held that the death penalty convictions violated the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and asserted:
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did
not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. Even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in
the science of law ....He requires the guiding hand of counsel at
every step in the proceedings against him.'
Thus, the Court recognized the importance of counsel, but focused on
the egregious facts involved in the case to constrain the reach of its
holding."0
In Johnson v. Zerbst,5' the Supreme Court took another step towards
By 1959, the following states provided some form of appointed counsel "for
indigent defendants accused of major, non-capital, offenses." The states that
compensated counsel when assignment of an attorney was at the trial court's discretion
were Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Texas and Vermont. The states that
compensated counsel when the assignment was mandatory upon the defendant's
request were Idaho, Iowa, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota,
Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Washington, Wisconsin and Wyoming. The states
that made the appointment of counsel mandatory for indigent defenders accused of
major non-felony offenses were Arkansas, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Delaware,
Kansas, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, Ohio, Virginia and West Virginia. Id. at
Diagram in Appendix.
44. 287 U.S. 45, 52 (1932).
45. Id. at 49.
46. Id. at 49-50.
47. Wolfram, supra note 43, at 62. When the defendants first appeared for trial,
some of them did have an attorney. Yet, the trial judge would not allow the attorney
to assist the defendants since he was a member of the Tennessee bar. The trial judge
appointed the entire bar of Scottsboro, Alabama in a half-hearted attempt to resolve the
problem. "With responsibility defused, indefinite, and impersonal, the appointment of
all led to the effective appearance of no one who could provide a real defense." Id.
48. Wolfram, supra note 43, at 62.
49. Powe/, 287 U.S. at 68-69.
50. Id. at 71. Some of the factors the Court focused upon were the defendants'
youth, lack of education, the intense public hostility against the defendants, the nature
of the charges, and the distance between them and their families. Id.
51. 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The U.S. Government prosecuted the two petitioners for
the possession of and the passing of counterfeit "twenty-dollar Federal Reserve notes."
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recognizing a defendant's right to the assistance of counsel. The Court
held that "[t]he Sixth Amendment withholds from federal courts, in
all criminal proceedings, the power and authority to deprive an
accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance of
counsel."5 2 Thus, the Court continued the process of giving the Sixth
Amendment meaning by shifting, in federal prosecutions, a defendant's right to counsel from a question of fundamental fairness to a
manda-tory procedure.
In Betts v. Brady,5" however, the Court appeared hesitant to extend
the right to counsel into the state courts. The Court ruled that the
concept of due process as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment
did not obligate the states to provide a criminal defendant with
counsel. 4 The Court reasoned that the history of the right to
counsel in the states demonstrates that the decision to require the
appointment of counsel is in the hands of the states.5 It also asserted
that it could not force the states to provide counsel because, under the
Due Process Clause, the Court could not define those circumstances
when the right to counsel becomes necessary to ensure fundamental
fairness.5" Consequently, the Court preferred to continue to rely on
its previously declared view that the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment only "prohibits the conviction and incarceration of one whose trial is offensive to the common and fundamental

Id. at 460.
52. Id. at 463. The Court also held that defendants, even those who are not
indigent, must be apprised of their Sixth Amendment right to counsel in order for
them to properly waive the right to the assistance of counsel. Id. at 468. If this does
not occur, "the Sixth Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction
. . .. Id. The Supreme Court also used this case to establish what constitutes a valid
waiver of a defendant's constitutional rights. The Court held that "[ t ] he determination
of whether there has been an intelligent waiver of the right to counsel must depend,
in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused." Id. at 464.
53. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
54. Id. at 471.
55. Id. at 471-72. Of all the state constitutions enacted at the time of this ruling,
every one, except Virginia's, contained a provision dealing with this issue. Id. at 467.
The Court found that "[t]hose of nine States may be said to embody a guarantee
textually the same as that of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 467-68. On the other hand,
it also found that in most states, their constitutional provisions reflect the preConstitutional sentiment that a defendant has the right to representation if he or she
procures it. Id. at 468.
56. Id. at 473. The Court believed the Due Process Clause did not enable them to
define when counsel is necessary. Justice Roberts argued that a literal reading of the
Due Process Clause 'would require the furnishing of counsel in civil cases involving
property." The Court avoided this difficulty by relying on notions of fundamental
fairness instead. Id.
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ideas of fairness and ight ....

"57

The reasoning of Betts, however, came crashing down when the
Court ruled in the seminal case of Gideon v. Wainwright that the right
to counsel is a fundamental right and "any person haled into court,
who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless
counsel is provided for him.""8 The Court recognized that since
America's law enforcement agencies now spend large amounts of
money prosecuting criminals, the defendant's need for an attorney
must simultaneously transform from a luxury to a procedural necessity.
The Court, in summarizing why it abandoned Betts' holding,
succinctly reasoned:
From the very beginning, our state and national constitutions and
laws have laid great emphasis on procedural and substantive
safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in
which every defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has to face
his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.'o
Although Gideon established an indigent defendant's right to
appointed counsel, it did not define when counsel should be made
available to a defendant. In the years succeeding Gideon, the Court set
out to define these parameters. 6' For example, on the same day the
Court decided Gideon, it held that a criminal defendant has the right
to the assistance of counsel for his or her first appeal.6 2 Four years
later, in In Re Gault,6" the Court held that juveniles also have the right
to appointed counsel when they are subject to a loss of liberty for acts
that, if committed by an adult, would constitute a crime.' Finally,
the apex of the evolution of the right to counsel culminated in

57. Id.; see GARCIA, supra note 16, at 8 (noting that this standard amounted to an
"insurmountable barrier" for most defendants, since they had to show that either they
suffered prejudice by proceeding without counsel or that the special circumstances of
the case necessitated counsel).
58. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
59. Id.; see GARCIA, supra note 16, at 9 (noting that as the government expends
more resources to secure a conviction the need for a defendant to have a lawyer also
escalates).
60. Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344.
61. See GARCIA, supra note 16, at 8.
62. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 358 (1963). "[W]here the merits of the one
and only appeal an indigent has as of right are decided without benefit of counsel, we
think an unconstitutional line has been drawn between rich and poor." Id. at 357; see
GARCIA, supra note 16, at 8 (observing that the Court relies on the mandate of the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses rather than the language of the Sixth Amendment).
63. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
64. Id. at 36-38.
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Argersinger v. Hamlin. 5 The Court articulated that "absent a knowing
and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense,
whether classified as petty misdemeanor, or felony, unless he was
represented by counsel at his trial."' Thus, Gideon, Argersinger, and
Gault established the essential structure
for appointing counsel to
67
indigent defendants in criminal cases.
Based upon these cases, the Court extended the right to counsel to
a wide range of criminal proceedings.'
It is clear, however, that
Gideon, and the decisions made afterwards, stand for the Court's
recognition "that indigency should not constitute a barrier to the fair
procedures integral to an adversary process of adjudication."69 After
all of these decisions, however, a key question still remained: How are
the states to provide appointed counsel to thousands of indigent
criminal defendants?
III.

PROVIDING ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL

A.

Overview of Systems Used Nationwide
Prior to Gideon, indigent criminal defendants who received counsel
did so due to the efforts of unpaid attorneys or charitable legal

65. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
66. Id. at 37. The Court refrained from ruling that the right to counsel is
dependent upon whether the trial is by jury or judge. Id. at 29-31. The Court
rationalized its approach for its conclusion stating that "[w]e are by no means
convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that actually leads
to imprisonment even for a brief period are any less complex than when a person can
be sent off for six months or more." Id. at 33. Justice Powell, in asserting that the
majority's rule does not go far enough, asserted that "[w]hen the deprivation of
property rights and interests is of sufficient consequence, denying the assistance of
counsel to indigents who are incapable of defending themselves is a denial of due
process." Id. at 48 (Powell,J., concurring). Powell predicted very accurately that even
the majority's rule would "have a seriously adverse impact upon the day-to-day
functioning of the criminal justice system." Id. at 52. The Court dismissed Powell's view
in Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979), when it held that the denial of counsel occurs
only when a person's conviction actually results in incarceration. See id. at 373-74.
67. Randolph N. Stone, The Role of State Funded Programs in Legal Representation of
Indigent Defendants in Criminal Cases, 17 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 205, 207 (1993).
68. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (probation and parole
revocation); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682 (1972) (post-indictment line-ups); Coleman
v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearings); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483
(1969) (for collateral attack in limited circumstances); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S.
218 (1967) (pre-indictment line-ups); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (right
to counsel in custodial interrogations); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)
(arraignments).
69. GARCIA, supra note 16, at 11.
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assistance.70 In response to Gideon's mandate, however, state and
county governments were required to implement some method of
supplying the indigent with legal representation. Basically, three
model systems evolved from this process.7'
One method of providing the indigent criminal defendant with
counsel is the contract system. In a contract system, either the state or
county government "receives bids from private law firms to handle all
or a portion of the county's indigent criminal cases." 7' The second
method of providing indigent representation is the assigned counsel
program. 7 This system typically consists of a trial court appointing a
private attorney to a case and then the county or state compensates the
attorney. 74 The third model is the public defenders office. With this

70. Jeffrey H. Rutherford, Comment, Dziubak v. Mott and the Need to Better Balance
the Interests of the IndigentAccused and PublicDefenders, 78 MINN. L. REV. 977, 982 (1994).

See generalySuzanne E. Mounts & RichardJ. Wilson, SystersforProvidinglndigentDefense:
An Introduction, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 193 (1986); William H. Beaney, The
Right to Counsel in THE RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED IN LAW AND ACTION 147 (1972)
(presenting the typical work of indigent defense lawyers).
71. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, INDIGENT DEFENDERS: GET THE JOB
DONE AND DONE WELL 13 (May 1992) [hereinafter NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS]. Although states and counties implement different defense system models, the
funding methodologies for these programs are very similar. Each system relies on
either state or county financing, or some combination of the two. Id.
72. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, 5-3.1 cmt.
(A.BA 1992). "Contract systems for the delivery of defense services were a new
phenomenon in the 1980s." Id. In 1986 contract systems accounted for 11% of county
defense systems. Id. These systems proliferated during this time due to the Supreme
Court's disdain for public defender offices representing multiple defendants. Id. Public
defenders also became concerned with this apparent conflict of interest Plus, contract
systems seemed like a less costly alternative to public defender systems. Id.
The value of contract defense systems is questionable. Meredith Anne Nelson,
Comment, Quality Controlfor Indigent Deense Contracts, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1147 (1988).
When government administrators consider bids, they tend to rely on the cost of the
contract as the sole criterion in making their decision. Id. at 1150. This leads attorneys
to underbid and ultimately results in attorneys spending less time with clients and
looking for the most cost-effective resolution of the case. Id. Thus, although contract
systems appear to give governments a cost-effective means of providing counsel, studies
show that "the contract system may provide less effective representation and fewer legal
services." Id. at 1151.
73. Nancy Gist, Assigned Counsek Is the Representation Effective?, 4 CRIM. JUST. 16
(Summer 1989).
74. Id. at 17. Typically the assigned counsel approach is not a program or system.
"[M]ore often than not 'assigned counsel program' is simply a euphemism for an ad
hoc method of providing defendants with lawyers, with judges or clerks recruiting and
assigning attorneys who are present in the courtroom or who are readily available to
represent indigent defendants." Id. Commentators repeatedly attack assigned counsel
programs due to lack of funding and the lack of independent administrators. Id. at 18;
see also Mark Ballard & Richard Connelly, Gideon's Broken Promise; Indigent Criminal
Defendants in Houston Are FarMore Likely to Serve Time, and More of It Than Those Who Can
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system, full-time salaried staff provide legal representation for the
indigent criminal defendant either on the state or county level.75
B. Providing the Assistance of Counsel in Minnesota
Prior to 1959, Minnesota's indigent defense program was an assigned
counsel system which was only available in felony and gross misdemeanor cases. 76 In 1965, Minnesota adopted legislation to create full77
time and part-time public defense offices in response to Gideon.
Although the system went unchanged for over a decade, the Minnesota
Legislature revised its initial approach throughout the 1980s.
The first significant change was the creation of a State Board of
Public Defense to oversee the state's public defender system. 78 The
State Board of Public Defense assumed the duty of appointing chief
public defenders to the legislatively designated districts. 79 The
legislature further delegated to the State Board of Public Defense the
responsibility of distributing state public defender funding to each
judicial district,8" although the counties remained the primary
funding source for Minnesota's Public Defenders Offices.
The Legislature continued to alter Minnesota's public defense system
through the end of the 1980s. 8 In 1989 the legislature began a

Afford PrivateCounsel, But With Little Agreement on Wy, There's No Consensus about What,

If Anything, to Do, TEXAS LAw., Aug. 28, 1995, at 1 (noting that the judges in Houston's
courts tend to play favorites and many assigned counsel do not possess a lot of litigation
experience). Assigned counsel systems are also subject to accusations of attorneyjudge
collusion. See Bruce Vincent, The Most GenerousJudge in Dallas, TEXAS LAW., Nov. 6,
1995, at 1 (focusing on flaws in Dallas' assigned counsel system by describing how an
attorney made over $200,000 while acting as assigned counsel in one trial judge's
courtroom).
75. Stone, supra note 67, at 209-10.
76. EQUAL JUSTICE FOR THE ACCUSED, supra note 43, at Appendix (citing MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 611.07, .12, .13 (1945)). Hennepin and Ramsey Counties had public
defender offices instead of an assigned counsel program. Id.
77. Act of May 26, 1965, ch. 869, §§ 1-20, 1965 Minn. Laws 1631 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. §§ 611.14-.35 (1994)). Minnesota Statute § 611.26 (1965)
provided for the appointment and financing of public defenders in Minnesota's ten
judicial districts. Each district administered its respective public defenders office and
property taxes collected by county governments funded each district's office. MINN.
STAT. § 611.27 (1965).
78. Act of June 1, 1981, ch. 356, § 360, 1981 Minn. Laws 1982 (codified as
amended at MINN. STAT. § 611.215 (1994)). The State Board of Public Defense is a
part of the judicial branch, but it is not subject to its administrative control. MINN.
STAT. § 611.215, subd. 1 (1994).
79. MINN. STAT. § 611.26, subd. 2 (1994).
80. Act of May 26, 1987, ch. 250, §§ 4, 17, 1987 Minn. Laws 891, 897.
81. The basis for the continual evolution of Minnesota's public defense system was
a result of the State Board of Defense and the Minnesota Legislature simultaneously
realizing that a state system would result in a more efficient system. Appellants' Brief
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program that shifted the financial burden of funding the state's public
defender offices from the counties to the state.82 Thus, the system
implemented in response to Gideon evolved from a county-based
organization into the state administered system which exists today in
Minnesota.
The current system consists of the State Board of Public Defense, the
Office of the State Public Defender, ten district public defender
offices, and five public defense corporations."3 A multitude of
counties comprise eight of the judicial districts, with Hennepin and
Ramsey Counties each composing their own district.8 4 Each chief
public defender must submit her annual budget to the State Board of
Public Defense.85 After the State Board considers each district's
proposed budget,86 and the legislature appropriates what it believes
to be sufficient funds, the State Board distributes funds to each public
defenders office.8 7 As seen both nationally and in Minnesota,
at 5, Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996) (No. CO-95-1282). This
realization was the result of three conclusions. The first conclusion was that the
counties could not cope with the skyrocketing costs of providing for their district public
defenders office. Second, some counties were capable of generating more property tax
revenue, and thus capable of allocating more resources than others. Lastly, "the
drought of the late 1980s had a significant impact on tax revenue in rural Minnesota,
making it difficult for those counties to meet the financial demands of the public
defense system." Id.
82. Act of June 3, 1989, ch. 335, art. 1, § 7, 1989 Minn. Laws 2699-700. The
transfer was to take place within one year, but the legislature extended the completion
date until 1997. See MINN. STAT. § 611.27, subd. 4 (1994), amended by 1995 Minn. Laws,
ch. 226, art. 6, § 14.
83. Appellants' Brief at 6, Kennedy (No. CO-95-1282).
84. MINN. STAT. § 2.722 (1994).
85. MTNN. STAT. § 611.27, subd. 1(b) (1994). The statute also limits what the chief
public defender may include in his or her budget proposal. Specifically, the statute
limits the state's obligation to "those items and services in district public defender
budgets which were included in the original budgets of district public defender officer
as ofJanuary 1, 1990." Id. at subd. 5. Furthermore, "[aIll other public defender related
costs remain the responsibility of the counties unless the state specifically appropriates
for these." Id. Since the public defenders of the Second (Ramsey) and Fourth
(Hennepin) District are full-time county employees under Minnesota Statute § 611.23
(1994), Minnesota Statute § 611.26 subd. 3(a) stipulates that "compensation and
economic benefit increases for chief public defenders and assistant district public
defenders, who are full-time county employees, shall be paid out of the budget for that
judicial district public defender's office." MINN. STAT. § 611.26, subd. 3(a) (1994).
86. MiNN. STAT. § 611.27, subd. 1(c) (1994).
87. Id. at subd. l(e). The State Board of Public Defense distributes the money
appropriated by the legislature based upon four criteria: "the geographic distribution
of public defenders, the equity compensation among the judicial districts, public
defender case loads, and the results of the weighted case load study." Id. The statute's
reference to a weighted case load study refers to the 1991 study solicited by the State
and conducted by the Spangenberg Group. See generally SPANGENBERG DRAFr REPORT,
supra note 11.
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however, changing to a state-wide system serves only to cover a gaping
wound with a small Band-Aid.
IV.

THE CURRENT CRISIS IN INDIGENT DEFENSE: WHAT Is CAUSING IT
AND WHAT ARE THE SYMPTOMS?

A. Events Impairing the Ability of Public Defense Systems to Provide
Competent Representation
Since the 1980s, the viability of public defense systems has been
under relentless attack. The forces leading this assault include a
multitude of factors, such as public misperception, political puffery,
and changing criminal statutes. Furthermore, this assault on the
nation's indigent defense systems, and ultimately the clients they
represent, has handicapped these systems to the point where representing the poor has become an exercise in futility.
The first round that breached the hull of public defense systems was
the politically popular "War on Drugs."88 During the Reagan and
Bush administrations, law enforcement activity concentrated on illegal
narcotic trafficking.8 9 At the same time, federal and state governments dumped millions of dollars into law enforcement budgets to
support this heightened enforcement activity. 9° Consequently, this
action led to an enormous increase in the number of drug offense
prosecutions. 9' As a result, the demand on indigent defense services

88. SeeJ. Craig Crawford, Nation's Drug WarFlawed, Group Says American BarAssociation Report Urges Emphasis on Prevention, Treatment, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Jan. 11, 1992, at
A3.
89. Id.
90. Timothy R. Murphy, Indigent Defense and the U.S. War on Drugs: The Public
Defender's Losing Battle, 6 CRIM. JUST. 14 (Fall 1991). See, e.g., Christopher Johns,

'SlaughterhouseJustice':CrushingWorkloads, UnderfundedPublicDefenders ShortchangeIndigent
Clients,ARIz. REPUBLIC, May 23, 1993, at C1;Jill Smolowe, The Trialsof the PublicDefender:
Overworked and Underpaid Lawyers Serve Up a Brand ofJustice That Is Not Always in Their
Clients' Best Interests, TIME, Mar. 29, 1993, at 48.
91. See John A. Martin & Michelle Travis, Defending the Indigent During a War on
Crime, 1 CORNELLJ.L. PUB. POLY 69, 75 (1992). "The total number of federal drug
offense prosecutions increased 153% from 1980 to 1987." Id. (citing 1989 BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJusTIE, BJS DATA REPORT 1989 36-37 (1990)). Also,
"[t]he number of federal drug offenders sentenced to prison for drug possession
increased by 434.2%, and for those convicted of drug trafficking the number increased
by 169.2%." Id. (citing 1989 BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SOURCE BOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 504 (1990)). But cf. Frank A. Aukofer,
Drug War a Big Flop, Report Says, MILWAUKEE J. AND SENTINEL, June 18, 1993, at Al
(citing preliminary report by federal General Accounting Office which concludes that
"the highly touted program of using military planes and ships to head off drug smugglers has done virtually nothing to reduce the flow of cocaine into the United States");
Jeff Gauger, DrugArrests Increasing, But So Are the Drugs, OMAHA WORLD-HERALD, June
14, 1992, at 18A (noting law enforcement officials acknowledgment "that more drugs
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also drastically increased.9" The impact to indigent defense services
proved even more severe than it did to other branches of the justice
system since so many drug offenders are indigent.93 Thus, the "War
on Drugs" overwhelmed the meager resources of most indigent
defense systems.
The second round fired into the side of this nation's indigent
defense systems is the failure of national and state governments to
increase defense system funding, while simultaneously inflating the
budgets of other criminal justice agencies. Indigent defense budgets
consistently decrease or remain the same, and do not increase like
other areas of criminal justice.94 New York City's experience serves
as a valuable example of this trend.95 In New York City, the significant increase in the number of narcotic related arrests led to a twentyfive percent increase in the organization's criminal cases while at the
same 96time New York City Legal Aid Society's staff grew only seven percent.

Moreover, the drastic increase in the number of juvenile offenders
also burdens indigent defense programs across the country.97 For
example, in many metropolitan areas the average juvenile caseload
ranges between eighty and ninety clients a month, which in turn leads
public defenders to rapidly surpass the National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals limit of two hundred juvenile
clients per attorney annually.98 This trend is not going to get better

are available more cheaply now than four years ago when federal funding of anti-drug
task forces began").
92. See Murphy, supra note 90, at 14.
93. Murphy, supra note 90, at 14. Seventy to ninety percent of all defendants
charged with a drug-related offense are indigent. Id.
94. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, JUSTICE EXPENDITURE
AND EmLOymhENT 8 (1990). In 1990 state and local governments spent approximately

$64 million dollars on this nation's justice systems. I& Police protection accounted for
$27 million. Id. Corrections received approximately $23 million. Id. Lastly,
prosecutors received approximately $4 million, while public defense's allocation was
$1.3 million. Id.; see also Johns, supra note 90, at Cl (noting that indigent defense
budgets are typically the first cut to increase funding for law enforcement).
95. Murphy, supra note 90, at 16.
96. Murphy, supra note 90, at 16. Similarly, "[i]n Los Angeles, 75% of all criminal
prosecutions are either for the sale or possession of drugs or drug-related crimes." Id.
"The number of defendants charged with felony drug-related crimes grew 159% in
Chicago from 1984 to 1988." Id.
97. Margaret Eckenbrecht, Juvenile Rights in Peri, ABA J. 106 (March 1996).
98. Id. Of the metropolitan areas surveyed, zero were "within the recommended
guidelines of 200 Uuvenile clients] per year." Id. National juvenile crime trends
supports the conclusion that this situation is not going to resolve itself. "Between 1990
and 1994, the rate at which adults age 25 and older committed homicides declined
22%; yet the rate jumped 16% for youths between 14 and 17, the age group that in the
early '90s supplanted 18- to 24- year olds as the most crime-prone." Richard Zoglin,
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in the near future. The rise in the number of juvenile arrests will
continue to burden public defender systems well into the future.9 9
In conclusion, the drastic increase in the number of drug offense and

juvenile crime prosecutions and the decrease in funding for the
defense of the poor negatively impacts all indigent defense services.i00
Another factor that handcuffs indigent defense systems is the "Get
Tough on Crime" mentality of politicians. 10 1 Politicians quickly
adopt such views because they sense that the voters perceive their
communities as becoming more and more violent.102 Politicians,

Now for the Bad News: A Teenage Time Bomb, TIME, Jan. 15, 1996, at 52; see also DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, NUMBER OFJUVENILE MURDERS TRIPLED OVER TEN YEARS, (1996) (available on
WESTLAW at 1996 WL 98657 (D.O.J)) (reporting "that the nationwide rate at which
juveniles were arrested for violent crimes increased 50 percent from 1988 to 1994").
The number of juvenile arrests in Minnesota is also quickly rising. "In 1992,
juveniles accounted for 26 percent of all arrests for violent crime in Minnesota,
compared with 18 percent nationally .... [a]nd they accounted for 51 percent of
property crimes in Minnesota, compared with 33 percent nationally." Mark Brunswick,
'93 Volence: Juveniles, Guns - and Tragedy, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Jan. 1, 1994, at BI.
Furthermore, "the number of juvenile arrests for violent crime increased 63 percent
from 1990 to 1994. All seven metropolitan counties, except Anoka and Ramsey,
recorded even sharperjumps." Jim Adams, Young and Violent:Juvenile Crime on the RisA
STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 24, 1995, at Al.
99. See Adams, supra note 98, at Al; Dark Clouds on the CrimeFront; Big Trouble Might
Arrive With a Big New Generation of Often Troubled Youngsters, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 27, 1995,
at B4;
see also Crime Drop: Waitin& Watchingfor the Next Wave, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), May 7, 1996, at Al (reporting that "though homicide among adults above age 25
dropped by 18 percent from 1990 to 1994, the rate of killing by 14- to 17-year-olds rose
22 percent during that time."); Loria Montgomery, Crime Drops across Nation: But Fear
a Rise as Teen PopulationGrows, HOUSTON CHRON., May 6, 1996, at 1 (noting that " [w]ith
the number of teen due to increase over the next decade, experts say, the nation soon
may see an explosion of juvenile violence to rival the drug-driven carnage of the late
1980s.").
100. Murphy, supra note 90, at 14.
101. See Mike Carter, Sex Crimes: Hard Time Is Costly Sex Crimes: Doing Hard Time Is
Costly, SALT LAKE TRIB., Feb. 26, 1995, at B1; Pat Flannery, Crime Plans Play to Voters,
Talking Tough CouldBe Key to Re-Election, PHOENIX GAZErE, Oct. 26, 1993, at Al; Patricia
Lopez Baden, Both Parties Target No. 1 Issue: Crime, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Feb. 19,
1994, at B1.
102. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegoy, Myth and Symbol in the
Adversarial Criminal Prouess - A Critique of the Role of the PublicDefender and a Proposalfor
Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 743, 770 (1995). It is possible to understand how the
public becomes misinformed about crime by looking at how television portrays it."Not
only is the amount of crime on television dramas exaggerated, but also the types of
crime depicted are exaggerated. Television crime is bloodier and more violent than
crime is in reality." Id. at 769. The reality is that while in 1981 there were 35.3 violent
crimes per 1000 people by 1992 the rate decreased to 32.1 crimes per 1000. NATIONAL
CRIME VICrIMIZATION SURVEY REPORT, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICrIMIZATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: 1973-1992 TRENDS 1 (1994). Yet, even in light of the current
trends in crime, a recent TIME / CNN poll found "89% of those surveyed think crime
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therefore, believe the public wants more done about crime.'
Elected officials react to the public's misguided perceptions in
several ways. First, politicians constantly promise to provide more
funds to law enforcement agencies in order to respond to the public's
fear of crime. "
More police officers on the street almost always
makes an elected official look more commendable.
Second, prosecuting authorities also get caught up in appeasing the
public. One consequence is that prosecutors become unwilling to
accept plea bargains. 0 5 This forces public defenders to expend
precious resources to accommodate a prosecutor's political ambitions.
A second consequence is prosecutors also refuse to accept a loss
because the public might believe they are incapable of handling a
community's crime problem. Thus, the resources of the criminal
justice system quickly drain when prosecutors repeatedly try notorious
defendants because the prosecutor does not want a loss to become a
political liability. 6
The final reaction to the public's generally misguided perceptions

is getting worse, and 55% worry about becoming victims themselves." Elaine Shannon,
State of the Union; Crime: Safer Streets, Yet GreaterFear,TIME, Jan. 30, 1995, at 63.
103. See Flannery, supra note 101, at Al (noting that candidates know that
"politically, crime sells."); John King, Crime Issue Tops Governor Races, TULSA WORLD,
Sept. 6, 1994, at N6 (campaigning politicians in thirty-six states promised some crime
reform package).
104.

See Pat Griffith, Cities to Get PoliceFunds Next Month, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,

Sept. 9, 1994, at A8 (citing U.S. Attorney General Reno's plan to have 20,000 additional
law enforcement officers on the street in the first sixteen months of the Clinton Crime
Bill); see also Steve Berg, The PresidentialVisit, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 13, 1994,
at Al (reporting on the President's pledge to continue advocating for campaign
promise of additional 100,000 police officers); Carolyn Skorneck, Clinton Unveils a Plan
For More Cops, Fewer Guns, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 11, 1993, at Al (detailing President
Clinton's plan "to tighten gun controls and put tens of thousands of new police officers
on the street.").
105. BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION
ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 83 (1988) [hereinafter REPORT TO THE NATION]. The following
jurisdictions adopted anti-plea bargaining policies: "Alaska; New Orleans, Louisiana; El
Paso, Texas; Blackhawk County, Iowa; Maricopa County, Arizona; Oakland County,
Michigan; and Mulmomah County, Oregon." Id. "These prohibitions range in
coverage from all felonies to only those that involve individuals charged under habitual
offender laws or with high-impact crimes." Id.
106. See Alan Abrahamson, To Retry, or Not to Retry, Is the Question; If a Second
MenendezJuy Is Hung, Both Sides Wl Have to Weigh How the PanelsSplit, and the Costs and
Risks of Another Round, LA TIMES, Jan. 27, 1994, at B1. Prosecutors estimated the cost
of re-trying the Menendez brothers at approximately one million dollars. Even though
the defendants seemed willing to accept a plea bargain, District Attorney Gil Garcetti
appeared unprepared to compromise. This is because his election to office stemmed
from his constant attack on the incumbent Ira Reiner's inability to win big cases. Thus,
if he failed to attain a conviction of the Menendez brothers, he may suffer the same fate
as his predecessor. Id.
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about crime is that politicians hastily adopt statutory amendments
which are intended to lead to more incarcerations and to make the
penalty for committing a crime much more severe. 10 7 The rub
begins, however, when politicians fail to recognize how their responses
to criminal activity impact the other parts of the justice system-getting
tough on crime costs money and lots of it.'0 8 Unfortunately, in a
time when the public demands that the government become fiscally
responsible, politicians do not view raising taxes to support their anticrime tactics as politically feasible." ° Therefore, politicians respond
by reducing the budgets of programs that are not politically popular,
107. See Mary Ann Roser, Senate Bills Target Sex Offenders, Nonviolent Felons, FORT
WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 5, 1995, at 19 (observing that Senate's enactment of

stricter penalties for sex offender and nonviolent felonies is in response to public
demand for more severe punishment); see also Eric Bailey & Paul Jacobs, One-Strike
Measurefor Sex-Offenders Praise HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Sept. 2, 1994, at 11 (noting that
the supporters of California's new law contend that the law gives California one of the
toughest penalties in the country for the crime of sexual assault); Robert Whereatt, New
CarlsonTelevision Ad Sounds Tough on Crime, Not His Opponent, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Oct. 14, 1994, at B2 (touting newly enacted statutes creating "new laws against sexual
predators, tougher penalties for guns in school and for violent crimes.").
An example of this phenomenon is the infamous "Three-Strikes" law enacted in
California. See Tupper Hull, A Father'sCrusade to Lock Up Criminals,'S.F. EXAMINER, Dec.
8, 1993, at Al. Mike Reynolds' daughter was the victim of a gunshot wound to the head
when she refused to turn over her purse. In response to his grief, Mr. Reynolds began
his campaign for the "Three Strikes and You're Out Initiative." The proposal required
.criminals convicted two or more times to serve at least 80 percent of their sentences."
Id. California is not the only state to consider such proposals. Id. Actually, Washington
was the first to enact such a law. See Kim Christensen, Focus on "Three Strikes," Washington
State Finds "3Strikes"No Simple Matter,ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Mar. 11, 1994, at A16.
New Jersey also recently began to debate the merits of its own three-strikes laws. See
P.L. Wyckoff, Assembly Takes Swing at 3-Strikes Crime Bi/./ THE STAR LEDGER (Newark),
Mar. 12, 1995, at Al.
108. See, e.g., Adam Pertman, CaliforniaDebates Costs of "Three Strikes Law", BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 19, 1995, at 1 (noting the California Department of Corrections will have
to spend $2 billion a year for the rest of the century to keep up with the state's growing
prison population); William Claiborne, "Three Strikes": Tough on Courts Too; California's
Sentencing Law Leads to Criminal Justice Logam, WASH. POST, Mar. 8, 1995, at Al
(reporting that the new statute is leading to a drastic reduction in "the number of
accused felons willing to offer guilty pleas."); William Claiborne, "3 Strikes" Crime
Approach Rethought; Fiscal Consequences Trouble Lawmakers, DENVER POST, Aug. 14, 1994,
at A2 (incarcerating inmates under "3 Strikes" law can cost between "$20,000 a year per
inmate to more than $60,000, as elderly inmates serving life terms require costly
medical care."); BethJ. Harpaz, Weighing Pros and Cons of "Three Strikes, You're In", THE
RECORD (New Jersey), Feb. 21, 1994, at A4 (noting that although the law is politically
popular the cost to the court system may be too great); Greg Moran, Three Strikes and
You're Out: Felons Face a Hardened Public Attitude, Critics Fear Proposed Law Would Be
Expensive Error,SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 6, 1994, at Al (arguing that California

should reconsider its "Three Strikes" law due to the enormous cost of incarcerating
felons convicted under the law).
109. SeeJohns, supra note 90, at Cl.
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such as the defense of the poor.110
This trend is especially damaging to indigent defense systems
considering this country's recent recession.'
The recession which
occurred during the late 1980s and into the early 1990s resulted in
more indigent defendants."'
Moreover, recent corporate downsiz-

ing"' and the creation of more technologically demanding occupations further exacerbate this trend." 4 In sum, political posturing
only leads to the depletion of an already stretched indigent defense
budget. This process of political hobbling results in impairing a system
of indigent defense that already struggles to make ends meet.
B.

How the Current State of Affairs Cripples the Defense of the Indigent

Excessive caseloads now characterize the typical indigent defense
system."' An overview of New Orleans and Florida's experiences
with excessive caseloads provides valuable insight into how burgeoning
caseloads currently typify indigent defense systems. In New Orleans,
a public defender handled approximately seventy felony cases
simultaneously." 6 He also represented 418 defendants over a sevenmonth period and had "at least one serious case set for trial for every
trial date during that period."" 7 Florida's public defenders have also

110. See RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, ABA SECTION OF CRIMINALJUSTICE
AD Hoc COMMITrEE ON THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS, THE INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS
1 (1993).

111.

Seeid.

112.

BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,

INDIGENT DEFENSE 2 (Feb. 1996) (concluding that in "constant dollars, the state and
local expenditures doubled for public defense from 1979 to 1990."). The fact that "[i]n
1992 about 80% of defendants charged with felonies in the Nation's 75 largest counties
relied on a public defender or an assigned counsel for legal representation" further
illustrates how large the indigent population has become. Id. at 1.
113. See Louis Uchitelle, The Downsizing of America STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar.
10, 1996, at A19 (noting that approximately "43 million jobs have been erased in the
United States since 1979.. . ."); see alsoRobert Reno, EconomicDouble Whammy, BUFFALO
NEWS, Jan. 22, 1996, at 3C; Louis Uchitelle & N. R. Klienfield, Huge White-CollarLayoffs
BatterEgos, Dreams, Work Ethic, COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Memphis), Mar. 10, 1996, at C3.
114. See, e.g., Matthew H. Bowers, Troubled Teens: Carnegie Study Says Adolescents Are
Desperately at Risk Neglected. Undereducated. Drinking Drugs., VIRGINIAN PILOT (Norfolk,
Va.), Oct. 13, 1995, at Al (quoting researcher's conclusion that businesses themselves
need to act to ensure qualified job applicants in the future); Elizabeth Wade Hall,
Business Push for 'Real-World' Training,THE HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Nov. 4, 1994,
at Al (quoting school board members who observed that "[s] chool districts... putting
technical training centers in place are very successful at helping students go into high
paying, post-secondary jobs.").
115. Robert L.Spangenberg & TessaJ. Schwartz, The Indigent Defense CrisisIs Chronic,
9 CRIM.JUST. 13 (Summer 1994).
116. Id. at 13 (citing State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993)).
117. Id. (citing State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993)).
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shared similar experiences."' Excessive caseloads strained the system
in the Tenth District of Florida so much that the public defenders had
to elect which cases to appeal first based on the severity of the
punishment.'
This created an immense backlog which affected
both the appellate and trial courts. 20 Although these are vivid
illustrations of how excessive caseloads have paralyzed indigent defense
systems, excessive caseloads also have a more subtle, but contemptuous
impact on the indigent defendant's right to the effective assistance of
counsel.
The first implication of excessive caseloads is that the indigent
defendant believes he or she does not receive adequate representaIndigent defendants typically believe that their public
tion.
defender is just another instrument of the state.1 22 "To compound
matters, the indigent defendant himself does not specifically choose
the public defender assigned to his case." 21 When an excessive
caseload strains a particular defense system, the indigent defendant
consequently feels even more alienated. 2 4 From the perspective of
the indigent defendant, "the publicly-funded defender is merely a cog
in the very 'court' bureaucracy that is 'processing' and convicting
him."1'2
A convicted felon's renowned statement that he did not
have an attorney, he had a public defender, attains a degree of validity
under these conditions. 26 Moreover, this perception intensifies a

118. In re Order on Prosecution of Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit
Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 1131 (Fla. 1990).
119. Id. at 1132. "For example, in the third district, approximately 15% of indigent
appellants serve their sentences before briefs are filed or their cases are disposed of by
the court." Id. at 1132 n.3.
120. Id. at 1131-32.
121. David A. Sadoff, Note, The Public Defender As Private Offender: A Retreat From
Evolving MalpracticeLiability StandardsforPublicDefenders, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 883, 891
(1995).
122. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
ConstitutionalRight to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. LQ. 625, 663
(1986).
123. Sadoff, supra note 121, at 891 (citing Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 11-14
(1983)).
124. Sadoff, supra note 121, at 891..
125. See Steve Brandt, Public Defenders Fight for the Poor and for Respect, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Dec. 14, 1992, at Bi. It is easy to see how indigent defendants get the
impression that their attorney is merely processing them. A Hennepin County Public
Defender noted that although she spends only three minutes of a morning before a
judge, those three minutes take away most of her morning, since she must "consult with
her clients, deal with a prosecutor and wait for cases to be called." Id.
126. Sadoff, supra note 121, at 892 (citing Stephen J. Schulhofer & David D.
Friedman, Rethinking Indigent Defense: PromotingEffective Representation Through Consumer
Sovereignty andFreedom of ChoiceforAll CriminalDefendants, 31 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 73,83-89
(1993)); see also Klein, supra note 122, at 661-62 (citing Jonathan D. Casper, Did You
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convicted defendant's feelings of betrayal and anger towards the
judicial system. 127 Thus, excessive caseloads clearly aggravate the
already strained relationship between the defendant and a public
defender.
The second implication of excessive caseloads is that it becomes
impossible for an attorney to adequately consult with his or her
client. 2 The Supreme Court articulated that "[i]t is the duty of an
attorney to advise the client promptly whenever he has any information... the client should receive.""
Furthermore, ABA Model
Standard 4-3.8 mandates that "[d]efense counsel should keep the
client informed of the developments in the case and the progress of
preparing the defense .... ""

Only with adequate client consulta-

tion may a defense attorney feel satisfied that her client understands
the implications of the charges against him and the options available
to the client. When excessive caseloads bombard the representatives
of the indigent, however, defense attorneys barely have enough time
to introduce themselves.'
Surely public defenders cannot provide
the communications their ethical duty requires them to provide.
The third consequence of allowing indigent representatives to work
under excessive caseloads is insufficient case preparation. 3 2 An
attorney has an ethical duty to investigate a client's claims thoroughly
so he or she may give sound legal advice.133 Attorneys in many cases,

Have a Lawyer When You Went to Court?No, I Had a Public Dfender, 1 YALE L. REV. L. &

Soc. ACTION 4 (1971)).
127. Klein, supra note 122, at 663-67.
128. Klein, supra note 122, at 667.
129. Baker v. Humphrey, 101 U.S. 494, 500 (1879).
130. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION 4-3.8(b) (A.BA Model Standard 1993) [hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL

JUSTICE]; see also MODEL RULE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILIY 1.4(a) (1983). "A lawyer
shall keep a client reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly
comply with reasonable requests for information." Id.
131. Sadoff, supra note 121, at 892. As if excessive caseloads are not enough
trouble, public defenders also have to try to communicate with clients when they are
either in jail awaiting trial or located far away from the public defenders office. Id. A
1987 survey of inmates in local jails demonstrates how the public defender-client
relationship becomes strained. Whereas 69% of all inmates who had counsel saw their
attorney within one week of being admitted, only 43% of all inmates represented by
assigned counsel saw their attorney in the same time period. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS SELECTED FINDINGS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INDIGENT DEFENSE 4 (1996).
132. Klein, supra note 122, at 663.
133. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 130, at 4-4.1 (a). This standard
requires that "[d]efense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the
circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits
of the case and the penalty...." Id. This standard further mandates that "[t]he duty
to investigate exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to defense
counsel of facts constituting guilt or the accused's stated desire to plead guilty." Id.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1996

23

1140

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 22, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 4
W0LLLAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22

however, cannot conduct any worthwhile investigation due to the
combination of inadequate funding and excessive caseloads."M
Indigent defense programs, unlike the state which has the support of
both local and federal law enforcement agencies, typically have a
limited number of investigators for too many clients."l 5 Consequently, it is not hard to perceive the correlation between the state and
defense attorney's investigation and the current level of plea bargaining. When the state is able to expend great amounts of money to
develop a case, is 6 and the burdens facing public defenders preclude
them from doing so," 7 it is obvious why so many defendants opt for
"the deal. " " Thus, the current state of indigent defense makes it
virtually impossible to conduct an investigation to ensure that not only
do indigent defendants receive their day in court, but that it actually
means something.
Minnesota's public defender system is also at the mercy of the
consequences of excessive caseloads. A study conducted for the State
Board of Public Defense3 9 concluded that "public defenders in
Minnesota, with few exceptions, are working substantially above
capacity with insufficient time to devote to their cases and their clients.
Workload is too high in every district given the current level of staff

134. Patrick Noaker, It Doesn't Come With the Territoy:PublicDefenders Must Decline to
Violate Legal and Ethical Standards in the Face of Rising Caseloads, 10 cRIM. JusT. 14
(Summer 1995). An example of the lack of attorney investigation exists in Minnesota.
According to the Spangenberg Group's report, law clerks assume too much of the
public defender's investigatory work. SPANGENBERG DRAFr REPORT, supranote 11, at 2930. The report took special offense of the fact that law clerks are often responsible for
"investigating serious felony cases." Id. at 30.
135. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, supra note 71, at 94. In a comparison
of prosecutor and public defender offices in Denver, Seattle, and Montrey, CA,
researchers found that each office had comparable numbers of felony attorneys. Id. at
95. "Public defender offices, however, tend to have slightly lower levels of administrative and clerical support. This pattern suggests that public defender offices are
allocating their budgets to achieve parity at the attorney level [both in numbers and
compensation]." Id.
136. REPORT TO THE NATION, supranote 105, at 123. Itis noteasy to document the
cost of an average police investigation. Id. at 125. This is because police officers often
pay informants for information and undercover officers spend large amounts of money
to intercept drug trafficking. Id. In contrast, the average cost per indigent case in 1982
was $196. Id. at 123.
137. See Smolowe, supra note 90, at 48 (observing that the New Orleans Public
Defenders Office "has no money to hire experts or track down witnesses; its law library
consists of a set of lawbooks spirited away from a dead judge's chambers.").
138. REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 105, at 83. "Most cases brought by a
prosecutor result in a plea of guilty." Id. In Minneapolis, 66% of the number of cases
filed (2364) resulted in guilty pleas. Id. In Los Angeles the percentage of guilty pleas
reaches as high as 82% of the cases filed. Id.
139. See SPANGENBERG DRAFr REPORT, supra note 11, at 3-4.
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(full-time and/or part-time). And things are getting worse in this
The growing number of defendants electing pro se
regard.""
representation rather than relying on the assistance of counsel
demonstrates how excessive caseloads have impaired Minnesota's
public defender system. 4 Thus, it is clear that, both nationally and
in Minnesota, excessive caseloads are impairing, or at least certainly
soon will impair, the ability of public defenders to render effective
assistance of counsel. 42

140.
141.

SPANGENBERG DRAFT REPORT, supranote 11, 20.
See Paul McEnroe, Going It Alone: ProSe Litigation, BENCH & BAR OF MiNN., Feb.

1996, at 17; Margaret Zack, Two Recent Cases Show That When People Act as Their Own
Attorneys in Criminal Cases, It May Mean Disasterfor Them, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar.
8, 1996, at B3.
142. The Spangenberg Group, in noting how excessive caseloads impact Minnesota's
public defense system, made the following observations:
1. Many public defender attorneys, both full-time and part-time, are now
faced with a serious case overload problem.
2. The Minnesota District Public Defender Program is just beginning to feel
a turnover problem and unless there is early caseload relief, the problem will
only get worse.
3. In most district offices, the supervision available is not sufficient since most
supervisors are required to handle a full or excessive caseload.
4. As the caseload rises, public defenders find that they are spending less
time with their clients which makes the attorney-client relationship more
difficult. As a result, in many cases defendants are more reluctant to engage
in plea bargaining that will frequently result to their benefit.
5. The pressure of caseload has in many instances resulted in fewer and fewer
cases going to trial as public defenders seek ways to dispose of cases without
the extended time necessary for trial.
6. In fact, some public defenders reported to us that they felt that they were
being punished by the system for going to trial since during the trial period
they would not be able to work on other cases.

8. Again, as the caseload has risen, many public defenders reported to us that
they are now cutting corners, which they did not do in the past. This may be
reflected in scheduling fewer investigations, doing less legal research, filing
fewer motions, spending less time with clients and trying fewer cases. While
these public defenders believe that they are currently maintaining the
constitutional requirements of effective assistance of counsel, they may not be
able to maintain this standard in the future without caseload relief.
9. Many public defender attorneys told us that the caseload has now reached
such proportions that not only are they spending less time with their clients,
but they are beginning to make subjective judgments about which cases and
which clients they will spend substantial time with. Some of these judgments
are made based upon the seriousness of the case and what is at stake for the
client. This process is typical for most public defender programs.
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C. Lack ofJudicial Supportfor Effective Assistance of Counsel
Indigent defense systems are also in their current debilitated state
because courts are unwilling to demand that the representation
provided to the indigent defendant retain a high degree of quality.
The courts consistently fail to protect the indigent defendant by
refusing to scrutinize a lawyer's conduct. The courts instead have
erected road blocks to ensure that they only have to give a cursory

review of a lawyer's actions. Courts, therefore, guarantee that an
indigent client has an attorney by his or her side, but fail to ensure
that the attorney does something when he or she is there.
Prior to the Gideon decision, courts ruled that an attorney's assistance
was ineffective only if the defendant could substantiate that the
representation was a "farce and mockery" of justice.14 These ineffective counsel cases focused on "whether the trial itself was a fair one
under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than on the question of
whether the attorney's conduct conformed to minimal standards of
competence. "144

After the Supreme Court handed down its opinion in Gideon,
however, the nation's courts struggled with the issue of what constituted "effective" assistance of counsel.1 45 The courts started to resolve
this dilemma by abandoning the "farce and mockery" standard."

On the other hand, some public defenders are making choices on how
they spend their time based upon the aggressiveness of the client, the
particular facts of the case, whether or not there is a confession and whether
or not the case can be easily disposed of. Within our experience, these
judgments are clear signs of overload.
10. Finally, because of lack of available time, public defenders throughout the
state are finding it increasingly more difficult to spend the time required for
trial preparation in those cases that are tried. The preparation may well
happen at a late date, one to two weeks before trial. This problem exists also
in preparing for sentencing in many cases. There simply is not enough time
to properly prepare each client's case for sentencing, particularly in the area
of alternative sentencing.
SPANGENBERG DRAFr REPORT, supra note 11, at 22-23.
143. GARCIA, supranote 16, at 32 n.296 (citing Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945)).
144. Laurence A. Steckman & Peter Daily, Attorney Inaction as Trial Strategy: A Study
of the Effects ofJudicial Use of Non-Action NeutralLanguage on the Analysis and Adjudication
of Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Under the Sixth Amendment, 6J. SUFFOLK ACAD.
L. 89, 94 (1989).
145. GARcIA, supra note 16, at 32; seeAvery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444 (1940); see also
Justice Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counse 42 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 28 n.76 (1973)
(providing a list of the cases that adopted the "[farce and] mockery" test).
146. GARCIA, supranote 16, at 32.
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This process, which began in the federal appellate courts,147 culminated in the case of Strickland v. WashingtonL'4
In Strickland, the petitioner called upon the Court to formulate 149a
standard under which counsel's assistance is no longer effective.
The Court responded to the petitioners request by adopting the
federal appellate courts' standards. 50 The Court held that:
First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was
deficient. This requires showing that counsel made errors so serious
that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must
show that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense. This
requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.' 5 '

At first glance, the Court's adoption of this "reasonable attorney"
approach appeared promising for indigent defendants whose public
defenders were unable to devote sufficient time and resources to their
cases. The Court nonetheless proved that appearances are sometimes
deceiving. 152 In an attempt to deter a flood of ineffective assistance
claims, 53 the Court limited the breadth of its decision by requiring
the petitioner to overcome what it characterized as a "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable

professional assistance."' 54
Furthermore, the second prong of the Strickland test does not look
at the quality of the representation.'-

On the contrary, it places an

147. Steckman & Daily, supra note 144, at 94. The Fifth Circuit, in MacKenna v.
Ellis, 280 F.2d 592 (5th Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 877 (1961), promulgated a
reasonable lawyer test. Id. This standard stipulated that an attorney's assistance is
effective if an attorney conducts herself like other reasonable attorneys in all stages of
a proceeding. Id. at 599. In United States v. Decoster, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
the D.C. Court of Appeals, in an attempt to define standards to apply in the reasonable
attorney test, adopted the American Bar Association's Project on Criminal Justice
Standards for the Defense Function. Id. at 304-05. For a thorough review of the
development of the various tests that the federal circuits employed, see generally
Richard P. RhodesJr., Note, Strickland v. Washington: Safeguardof the CapitalDefendant's
Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel?, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD LJ. 121, 124-35 (1992).
148. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
149. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 684.
150. Id; see RhodesJr., supra note 147, at 141.
151. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.
152. Rhodes Jr., supra note 147, at 137-38.
153. Strickland,466 U.S. at 690. The Court purposefully avoided precisely defining
what the duties of a reasonable attorney are for this reason. According to the Court,
"[t] he availability of intrusive post-trial inquiry into attorney performance or of detailed
guidelines for its evaluation would encourage the proliferation of ineffectiveness
challenges." Id.
154. Id. at 689 (citing Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
155. Klein, supra note 122, at 644.
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insurmountable burden on the defendant to show that the representation was so shoddy that prejudice resulted. 5 6 "By requiring a
demonstration of prejudice, the Court took the position that a
defendant could be jailed even when all parties agreed that his counsel
substantially failed to represent him."' 57 Consequently this changes
the impetus of the federal appellate holdings from assuring quality
representation of criminal defendants to a mere question of whether
the process is working in the opinion of the reviewing court. 58
Thus, under the Strickland doctrine, indigents have a virtually impassable road to travel in order to garner relief from the ineffective
assistance of counsel they received.' 59
Unfortunately, the Strickland doctrine only assists state and local
governments in perpetuating a substandard level of indigent representation." By formulating a standard that allows defendants to remain
incarcerated in light of drastic attorney errors, the judicial system
implies that the right to counsel in reality has no meaning. 61' Since

156. Klein, supra note 122, at 644. Accordingly, this rule actually creates a paradox
that an ineffectively represented defendant cannot escape. "When there have been the
most egregious failings by counsel is exactly when the record may indeed be barren of
any indication of reasonable doubt. Yet, it is those very situations where courts now
need not even proceed to attempt to discover the failings of counsel." Id. at 645.
157. Steckman & Daily, supra note 144, at 101.
158. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. The Court avoided using the Sixth Amendment as
a standard for determining the quality of the representation. The Court reasoned that
"[t]he purpose [of the Sixth Amendment] is simply to ensure that criminal defendants
receive a fair trial." Id.
159. The Supreme Court released a companion case, United States v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648 (1984), the same day as Strickland In Cronic, the Supreme Court considered
whether, on the whole, an attorney rendered ineffective assistance of counsel when the
attorney only had 25 days to prepare a defense to a case that took the government more
than a few years to develop. Id. at 649-50. The Supreme Court, reversing the court of
appeals' finding of ineffective assistance of counsel, held that reversal is only
appropriate when the adversarial process "loses its character as a confrontation between
adversaries." Id. at 656-57. The Court went further, making relief more difficult to
attain, by reasoning that only upon a showing of specific errors by the attorney will the
Court consider the claim. Id. at 658. Thus, "[f]raining the analysis in this manner
suggests only that a certain type of proceeding is required, and does not address the
effect of imbalances that exist within such a proceeding." William S. Geimer, A Decade
of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinaland PracticalUnderminingof the Right to Counsel, 4 WM.
& MARY BILL RTs.J. 91, 123 (1995).
160. See Geimer, supra note 159, at 93.
161. See Martin C. Calhoun, How to Threadthe Needle: Toward a Checklist-BasedStandard
for EvaluatingIneffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO.J.L., 413, 429-30 (1988). The
Supreme Court adopted a standard which implies that since the defendant is guilty
anyway, only the most extreme cases of attorney ineffectiveness warrant reversal. Id.
Yet, "[t]he principle of 'innocent until proven guilty' upon which our entire criminal
justice system is based, requires that no defendant be declared 'guilty' unless the
government, opposed by constitutionally adequate defense counsel, proves guilt beyond
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the courts are unwilling to guarantee indigent criminal defendants
quality representation, there is no incentive for state or municipal
governments to do so either.16 Therefore, the courts currently serve
only to reinforce the current conditions which are impairing all
indigent defense systems.
In light of the aforementioned, it is clear that Minnesota's public
defender system is at a crossroads. If Minnesota's public defenders do
not receive adequate support soon, the tumultuous environment in
which they now practice will compel them to provide grossly inadequate representation. It is the Minnesota Legislature's continued
refusal to acknowledge this reality which led to Kennedy v. Carlson."
V.

KENNDY V.

CAPLSON

A.

FactualBackground
William Kennedy, the Chief Public Defender for the Fourth Judicial
District, commenced an action against Governor Arne Carlson,
Treasurer Michael A. McGrath, Commissioner of Finance John
Gunyou, the State Board of Public Defense, and the Hennepin County
Commissioners."
Kennedy filed suit after he sought additional
funding from the Board of Public Defense and Hennepin County and
did not receive any relief. 1" The purpose of the litigation was to
attain a declaratory judgment finding Minnesota Statutes section
611.2716 systematically unconstitutio because it violates the constitutional rights of indigent criminal defendants to the effective assistance

a reasonable doubt." Id. Justice O'Connor acknowledges that "[t]he right to counsel
plays a crucial role in the adversarial system.., since access to counsel's skill and
knowledge is necessary to accord defendants the 'amply opportunity to meet the case
of the prosecution' to which they are entitled." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
685 (1984) (citing Adams v. United States ex. teL McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1942)).
Justice Marshall, in his articulate dissent, soundly reasons that "[e]very defendant is
entitled to a trial in which his interests are vigorously and conscientiously advocated by
an able lawyer." Id. at 711.
162. See Smolowe, supra note 90, at 48 (noting that defending the poor "is a cause
without a constituency").
163. 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996).
164. Id. at 3.
165. Respondent's Brief at 6, Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996) (No.
CO-95-1282).
166. MINN. STAT. § 611.27 (1994). The parties and trial court focused on the
language found in Minnesota Statute § 611.27, subd. 7 (1994), which states:
[T] he state's obligation for the costs of the public defender services is limited
to the appropriations made to the board of public defense. Services and
expenses in cases where adequate representation cannot be provided by the
district public defender shall be the responsibility of the state board of public
defense.
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for the operation of the
of counsel by not providing sufficient funds
16 7
Fourth District Public Defenders Office.
B.

The State of Minnesota'sResponse
Minnesota asserted that the statute in question is not unconstitutional since there is no evidence that the Fourth District public defenders
are providing inadequate representation."6 In support of its position,
Minnesota first noted that a trial court has yet to find that an attorney
from the Fourth District Public Defenders Office has "provided
ineffective assistance of counsel to a client" 69 or that an appellate
court has had to reverse a conviction due to the performance of a
public defender.17
Moreover, Minnesota observed that there has
been no violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct found,17 ' and
a public defender has yet to be civilly liable. 17 The State supported
its argument in a third way contending that the Fourth District public
defenders effectively raise issues'73 and process their cases faster than
the state average. 74 Lastly, the State cited the Fourth District trial
judges who claim that the Fourth District Public Defenders Office does
a tremendous job. 175 Thus, according to Minnesota, the statutory
provision is not unconstitutional because the Fourth District Public
Defenders Office only alleges that the current funding apparatus
"potentially" violates the rights of the clients they represent. 7 6
Minnesota's second argument in favor of maintaining the status quo
is that a comparison of the Fourth District Public Defenders Office to
other states' public defender systems demonstrates it is not operating
unconstitutionally.1 77 The State asserted that other state courts find
their public defense systems are acting unconstitutionally only when
there are "serious and extensive incidents of actual ineffective
assistance of counsel ... ,7. The State concluded, therefore, that

167. Kennedy v. Carlson, No. MC92006860 at 2 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 1995) (order
granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment).
168. Appellants' Brief at 16, Kennedy (No. CO-95-1282).

169. Id. at 24.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 25.
172. Id. at 28.
173. Id. at 25.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 25-26.
176. Id. at 26.
177. Id.
178. Id. The State relied on several cases to prove its argument. Id. at 26-28; see
State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 784 (La. 1993) (concluding system is unconstitutional in
light of evidence that a public defender had a serious case scheduled for trial every day
for seven months, clients stay in jail for 30 to 70 days before even meeting their
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since there is no evidence of such deficiencies in Minnesota, the
Fourth District Public Defenders Office is not unconstitutionally
providing legal assistance.' 79

Minnesota's final argument was that the statute in question is
constitutionally valid since there are other resources available to
Minnesota's public defenders."
It contended that the Fourth
District Public Defenders Office should first look to Hennepin County,
which generates a majority of the Fourth District's indigent defense
needs, for additional funding.'
Additionally, Minnesota asserted
that there is a statutory safety valve that prevents the Fourth District
public defenders from violating their constitutional and ethical
duties.'
Minnesota also proposed that the Fourth District Public
Defenders Office should revise its screening process 83 and reconsider the types of cases it will take."8 Thus, the State concluded that

attorney, and there is a lack of sufficient services); In re Order on Prosecution of
Criminal Appeals by the Tenth Judicial Circuit Public Defender, 561 So. 2d 1130, 113133 (Fla. 1990) (finding of unconstitutionality based on 1700 pending appeals and
appellate waiting period of over two years); State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1380-81 (Ariz.
1984) (finding bid system unconstitutional based on finding of a part-time public
defender who had 25 trials in one month); State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64,
66 (Mo. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982) (basing its finding of unconstitutionality on the number of appeals arguing deprivation of reasonable defense due to
lack of funds).
179. Appellants' Brief at 28, Kennedy (No. CO-95-1282).
180. Id. at 30.
181. Id. at 31. The State asserted that the Hennepin County Public Defenders
Office's claim was not ripe. It relied on the fact that Hennepin County "funded a
substantial portion of Plaintiffs operating expenses even since the State took over
funding of the district public defender offices." Id. Hennepin County, in order for the
Hennepin County Public Defenders Office to drop the County from the suit, agreed to
provide additional funding. Id.
182. Id. at 30-31. The State referred to Minnesota Statute § 611.27, subd. 11 (1994),
which states that "[ii f the court finds that the provision of adequate legal representation ... is beyond the ability of the district public defender to provide, the court shall
order counsel to be appointed, with compensation and expenses to be paid under the
provisions of this subdivision and subdivision 7." Id. It is the State's position that "[t]he
cost of such services are to be paid by the Commissioner of Finance from the county
criminal justice aid retained by the Commissioner of Revenue for this purpose under
Minn. Stat. § 477A.0121, subd. 4." Id. at 30.
183. Id. at 32. The State vigorously asserted that the Hennepin County Public
Defenders Office needs to implement more stringent screening standards to ensure that
those clients who receive representation actually are indigent. Id.
184. Id. The State proposed three reforms that could alleviate the Public Defender's
financial woes. The State first recommended that the Hennepin County Public
Defenders Office cease handling matters outside of its normal caseload. This includes
"appeals and various civil matters such as forfeitures, implied consent and tax liens." Id.
at 31. The State's second recommendation is that Hennepin County Public Defenders
Office hire more investigators and less attorneys to lower operating expenses. Id. at 3132. An alternative approach is for the Hennepin County Public Defenders Office to "set
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the Fourth District Public Defenders Office cannot assert it is currently
operating in violation of the Constitution until the Fourth District
Public Defenders Office shows it sought to supplement its funding or
that it cannot revise its current procedures.
C.

The Fourth DistrictPublic Defenders' Perspective

William Kennedy maintained that every day actual injuries to the
rights of indigent criminal defendants occur. Kennedy first cited the
fact that his office's caseload exceeds the caseload standards recently
adopted by the State Board of Defense." Kennedy argued that his
office's excessive caseloads, when combined with the seriousness of
crimes committed today and their associated consequences, place an
indigent criminal defendant's rights in peril. 86 Thus, according to
Kennedy, without more funding, it is not possible to guarantee an
indigent criminal defendant his or her fundamental rights.
Next, Kennedy argued that a showing of civil liability or a reversal of
a conviction is not necessary to substantiate that an actual injury
occurred. 7 _ Kennedy contended that his attorneys have a legal
obligation to accept every client given to them."8 He points out that
a lack of any public defender's civil liability is due to the inability of an
indigent criminal defendant to hold a public defender liable for
malpractice under state law, and not due to the excellent performance

up programs with private law firms whereby the firms' attorneys would handle certain
cases .. , in exchange for obtaining courtroom expertise." Id. at 32.
185. Respondent's Brief at 5, Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996) (No.
CO-95-1282). The Board of Public Defense adopted a modified version of the standards
promulgated by the Spangenberg Group. Id. The Spangenberg Group's caseload
standards are:
The caseload of a public defender attorney should not exceed the
following: felonies per attorney per year: not more than 150; misdemeanors
(excluding traffic) per attorney per year: not more than 400; juvenile court
cases per attorney per year. not more than 200; mental Health Act cases per
attorney per year: not more than 200; and appeals per attorney per year: not
more than 25.
SPANGENBERG DRAFT REPORT, supranote 11, at 10 (quoting NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N
ON CRIMINALJUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOAlS, TASK FORCE ON COURTS 186 (1973)). The
American Bar Association also adopted these standards. See STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, 72 (A.B.A. Model Standards 1993). Kennedy
contended that his office, in Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993),
substantiated "that according to the Board's standards ordered by the legislature, the
attorneys [in his office] have caseloads that are 50 to 100 percent higher than
recommended." Respondent's Brief at 9, Kennedy (No. CO-95-1282).
186. Respondent's Brief at 6, Kennedy (No. CO-95-1282). Kennedy cited, as
illustrations, that a murder conviction can result in a 30-year prison sentence and that
the number of defendants charged with gross misdemeanors is on the rise. Id.
187. Id. at 10.
188. Id. (citing Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993)).
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of his office.' 89 Furthermore, the relief sought in this case is not
retrospective like an appeal from a criminal conviction." ° Instead,
Kennedy sought relief to eliminate the egregious ethical violations that
occur prior to conviction."' The lack of reversals is consequently
not indicative of the Fourth District Public Defenders Office's current
capabilities. Kennedy, therefore, asserted that the combination of
compelled ethical violations and the law's mandate that public
defenders cannot refuse to represent indigent defendants places his
office in a precarious position, which only more funding can allevi92
ate.1
Kennedy's third argument was that the relatively consistent level of
funding provided to his office serves only to exacerbate this problem.
Between 1991 and 1994, the Fourth District public defenders'
allocations increased on average only 1.7% annually.'9 Furthermore,
Hennepin County is not a viable source of funding because it already
Since no other
contributes over three million dollars a year."
because there is
County,
and
funds
like
Hennepin
county contributes
no statutory duty for them to do so, Kennedy concluded that relying
upon Hennepin County's generosity is not a workable funding alternative. 95 Thus, the only option that will resolve the Fourth District
Public Defenders Office's dilemma is to find section 611.27 unconstitutional.
Finally, Kennedy asserted that the State's purported statutory safety
valve is not sufficient, since all the public defenders offices in the state
share this reserve and there just is not enough for everyone.

189. Id. (citing Dziubak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993)).
190. Id. at 11. Kennedy argued that the rule of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984), does not apply in these circumstances. The basis of Kennedy's conclusion

is that Stricklands rule "was intended to provide a retrospective remedy for the very few
defendants who were prejudiced by the unethical conduct of their lawyers, not a
prospective standard for determining whether a lawyer's ethical duties have been
fulfilled." Id.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 10.
193. Brief of Amicus Curiae AFSCME Local 2938 at 8-9, Kennedy v. Carlson, 544
N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996) (No. CO-95-1252). The allocations to the Hennepin County

Public Defenders Office range from $7,683,000 in 1991 to $8,179,000 in 1994. Id. at
8 (citing Appellants' Brief at 13, Kennedy (No. C-95-1559)). Amicus notes that "a 1.7
percent increase in years characterized by 3 percent inflation demonstrates that real
dollar appropriations to the FourthJudicial District [Hennepin County] have declined."
Id. at 9.
194.

Respondent's Brief at 14, Kennedy, (No. CO-95-1282).

"Hennepin County

provides approximately 30% of the budget of the Fourth Judicial District Public
Defenders Office, and 15% of the total budget statewide." I& at 6.
195. Id. at 14.
196. Id. Kennedy asserted that under Minnesota Statute § 477A.0121, all public
defender districts share in a reserve that consists of only $200,000.00 Id.
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Kennedy also argued it is the trial judge, and not his office, that
determines which clients are indigent. 9 7 The Fourth District Public
Defenders Office, therefore, has no control over which clients it
receives.19 Because of the insufficiency of the state's supplemental
funding and the Fourth District Public Defenders Office's lack of
discretion over which clients it accepts, Kennedy concluded that
section 611.27 is unconstitutional since it leaves his office with no other
alternative than to deny indigent criminal defendants due process."'
D. The Trial Court's Holding and Reasoning
In ruling upon both the State's and the Fourth District Public
Defenders Office's motions for summary judgment, the trial court
entered judgment in favor of the Fourth District Public Defenders
Office. 2' The trial court further held that section 611.27, subdivision 7 "is an unconstitutional infringement upon plaintiff's [Fourth
District Public Defender Office] constitutional duty to provide effective
assistance of counsel to indigent clients." 20 1 The trial court held the
statutory provision unconstitutional for several reasons.0 2
The trial court first reasoned that it does not matter who is
ultimately responsible for funding indigent criminal representation. 23 Instead, the court articulated that it had an obligation to act
"when budgetary limitations adversely affect the actual delivery of
In light of this
effective legal services to an accused person."2
obligation, the court did not consider the lack of a showing of harm
to an individual as conclusive. 2 5 The trial court also did not view
this case as a traditional ineffective assistance claim. 20 6 It character-

ized this case as an action "seeking systemic relief from arbitrary
legislative action ..... 207 The trial court, therefore, found that the
Fourth District Public Defenders Office suffered the requisite injury

197. Respondent's Brief at 14, Kennedy (No. CO-95-1282) (citing MINN. R. CRIM.
PROC. 6).

198. Id. at 14-15.
199. Id. at 16.
200. Kennedy v. Carlson, No. MC-92-6860 at 2 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 1995) (order

granting plaintiffs motion for summary judgment).
201. Id. at 14.
202. Id. at 5-13.
203. Id. at 5.
204.

Id.

205. Id. at 6.
206. Id. at 10.
207. Id. The trial court rejected the State's reliance on Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984). The trial court held that Stricklands test does not apply here since
the focus of this case is on "the financial resources available to hire personnel to
provide counsel in individual cases." Id.
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upon which it could grant relief based upon its conclusion that the
current capabilities
of Minnesota's public defender system are in
08
serious jeopardy. 1

Next, the trial court focused upon the inflexibility of section 611.27.
The trial court found that the statute was too unyielding and it could
2
not compensate for the unpredictable nature of public defense. 09
It also found that the statute "fails to accommodate the increasing
pressures on the public defender system resulting from new legislation
and changing social conditions." 2 0 The court reasoned that in an
adversarial system espousing equal justice, comparable funding is
necessary to support this ideal.2 11 Therefore, the trial court held that
the statute was an attempt by the State to unconstitutionally cap the
money it provides for the representation of indigent criminal defendants because of the statute's inability to deal with change. 1 2
Lastly, the trial court held that the State's purported alternatives are
not sufficient.21 As for the statutory safety valve, the trial court
viewed the statute as not providing sufficient relief and only serving as
a temporary solution.1 4 The court, instead, relied upon the State's
continual reluctance to fund public defense systems21 5 when it
concluded that the availability of other sources did not render section
611.27, subdivision 7 constitutionally valid.216 Thus, the trial court
held that section 611.27, subdivision 7 forced the Fourth District Public
Defenders7 Office to unconstitutionally render ineffective assistance of
21
counsel.

In sum, the trial court granted the Fourth District's motion for
208. Id.
209. Id. at 12.
210. Id.
211. Id. The trial court also pointed out that "[t] here is no legislative funding cap
on prosecutorial resources." The trial court continued by noting that the chief concern
of the court is "whether defendant received the effective assistance required to assure
him a fair trial and the integrity of our adversary system ofjustice." Id. (citing Weaver
v. State, 408 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)).
212. Id. at 11-12. The trial court concluded that while "[c]ounties had certainly
never held out a blank check for public defense .... some flexibility" was inherent in
the way the counties provided for public defense. Id.
213. Id. at 13-14.
214. Id. at 13. The trial court observed that "[s]uch services must still be paid from
the legislature's appropriation and are subject to the limitation of Minn. Stat. § 611.27
Subd. 7." Id.
215. Id. at 9. The trial court noted that the allocations made to the Hennepin
County Public Defenders Office "from the State Board [of Public Defense] have been
considerably lower" than the amount requested. The trial court also observed that "the
Hennepin County Public Defenders Office has run significant budget deficits in 1992,
1993, and 1994." Id.
216. Id. at 13.
217. Id. at 14.
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summary judgment because it viewed section 611.27, subdivision 7 as
an unconstitutional restraint on the State's obligation to provide
counsel for the indigent. The court found that the statute placed the
Fourth District public defenders precariously close to harming their
clients' rights. So close, in fact, that the court was unwilling to uphold
the statute as a constitutional enactment. Lastly, the court rejected
Minnesota's alternative solutions by holding that the State's options are
insufficient and just another attempt at avoiding the need to reevaluate how Minnesota funds its public defense system. Although the
trial court correctly saw the condition of Minnesota's public defense
system, the Minnesota Supreme Court chose to wear blinders when it
glanced at the current state of indigent representation.
E. The Minnesota Supreme Court's Holding and Reasoning
The Minnesota Supreme Court, in reversing the trial court, did not
give any credence to the trial court's conclusions.1 8 The supreme
court, unlike the trial court, focused upon the issue of whether the
Fourth District Public Defenders Office demonstrated sufficient injury
to sustain a justiciable claim.1 9 The supreme court did not affirm
the trial court's judgment because it found that the Fourth District did
not show
that any of its indigent clients had suffered actual inju0
ries.

22

Prior to considering the merits of Kennedy, the supreme court first
set out to establish how it views the role of the public defender.221
The supreme court asserted that "Minnesota's judiciary has long
recognized the importance of criminal defense counsel, and we are
concerned that adequate funds be available for public defense services
to indigent juveniles and adults." 2' The supreme court also recognized that there are many factors, such as changing criminal statutes
and the number of indigent defendants, which prevent the Fourth
District from providing exemplary representation. 223 Thus, it appears
that the court was fully aware of the environment in which indigent
defense currently takes place. Also apparent is the court's willingness
to affirm the trial court's holding that the judiciary cannot allow the
State to abrogate its constitutional obligations.
Surprisingly, however, the supreme court decided just the opposite.
The court undermined its purported support for Minnesota's public
defenders by attempting to establish that the Fourth District's position

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.

See Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d I (Minn. 1996).
Id. at 5-8.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 3-4.
Id.
Id.
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is less than perilous. 22 4 According to the supreme court, the Fourth

District public defenders are in no danger of violating an indigent
defendant's constitutional rights. 5 The court reached
this conclu226
sion based upon three superficial rationalizations.
First, the supreme court reasoned that the Fourth District public
defenders cannot assert they are underpaid and understaffed. The
court took special notice of the fact that the Fourth District has more
attorneys than the rest of Minnesota's Public Defender Offices.227
The supreme court also construed the fact that the Fourth District
Public Defenders Office "has more investigators, law clerks and other
non-attorney support staff" than the rest of Minnesota's judicial
districts to mean the Fourth District Public Defenders Office is not in
a position to complain about the allotments it receives. 228 Thus, the
court reasoned that since the Fourth District has the most attorneys
and support staff in the State, it is difficult to perceive why the Fourth
District public defenders need any relief.
The next basis for the supreme court's reasoning was its reliance on
the opinions of the Fourth District judges. The State "submitted
copies of numerous letters from Fourth Judicial DistrictJudges written
in support of Kennedy's bid for reappointment" 229 in an attempt to
substantiate that the Fourth District's judiciary does not perceive a
problem. According to these judges, the public defenders in the
Fourth District are providing the highest caliber of service possible.2 3
Hence, the supreme court rationalized that since the judges who deal
with the Fourth District public defenders on a regular basis do not
perceive any problems, neither should the court.
The supreme court's final rationalization was the Fourth District
public defenders cannot claim they are in peril, since they have
incurred neither civil malpractice liability nor formal professional
responsibility reprimands.3 1 The court relied on the fact that "no
Fourth District public defender has been disciplined for violations of
the Rules of Professional Responsibility, nor has any court held that
23 2
Kennedy's staff has provided ineffective assistance of counsel."
The court's reliance on the lack of a formal finding of professional
incompetence established that the court is not likely to consider a

224. See id. at 6-7.

225. Id.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 7.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id. at 7 n.6.
Id.
Id. at 6-7.
Id. at 7 n.6.
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Minnesota public defender's claims until a public defender receives
some sort of formal disciplinary action. Thus, the supreme court
reasoned that the measure of whether Minnesota's public defenders
are violating their clients constitutional rights is not determined by the
harm to the defendant, but the harm to the public defender.
In sum, the supreme court sealed the fate of the Fourth District's
claim by holding that until there is evidence that an indigent criminal
defendant suffered an actual injury, it cannot consider the claims of
the Fourth District. 3 3 The court's demand for this type of proof of
harm is comparable to the problematic standards found in Strickland
v. Washington. This requirement of an actual injury to the indigent
defendant serves to create a virtually insurmountable barrier for any
Minnesota Public Defenders Office to overcome. The supreme court,
therefore, mandated that Minnesota's indigent defense systems need
to be on the verge of ruin before the court is willing to intervene.
VI.

SENDING A MESSAGE: THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT SHOULD

HAVE AFFIRMED THE TRIAL COURT AND FORCED THE LEGISLATURE TO
UPHOLD ITS CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION

The Minnesota Supreme Court should have concluded, as the trial
court did, that Minnesota's indigent defense funding apparatus
possesses constitutional flaws. Clearly, as a system of indigent defense, the
Fourth District Public Defenders Office is either on the verge of or
already is rendering unconstitutional ineffective assistance of counsel.
The supreme court failed to protect the rights of those who cannot
protect themselves when it did not accept the Fourth District's
invitation to remedy the situation at hand.
It is clear that the supreme court should have concluded that the
Fourth District Public Defenders Office, as section 611.27 forces it to
currently operate, is providing a level of sub-standard representation
which either harms or immediately threatens to harm the indigent
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel. The court
erroneously concluded that since the Fourth District Public Defenders
Office has the most staff, it therefore is not in a position to seek relief.
The court continued down its illogical path by not recognizing the
consequences of forcing the Fourth District Public Defenders Office to
exceed the State Board of Defense's caseload standards. The most
baffling error, however, is the court's reliance on the lack of individualized harm to the Fourth District's public defenders. Rather than
focusing upon how the current environment saddles the representation
of the poor, the court mistakenly looked for harms which are not
perceivable in the context of this lawsuit.

233. Id. at 6-7.
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If the supreme court had properly analyzed the circumstances
surrounding Kennedy, the court would have followed the example of
other states and adopted their remedial measures. These remedial
measures include declaratory relief, allowing public defenders to
decline to represent indigent clients when their caseloads exceed the
State Board of Defense's standards, and implementing a modified
version of the Strickland test.
A.

There Is a Potentialor Actual Injury Upon Which the Minnesota
Supreme Court Could Grant Relief
The Minnesota Supreme Court should not have reversed the trial
court, since the Fourth District Public Defenders Office clearly is on
the verge of, or already is, providing constitutionally defective
representation. Furthermore, the facts of this case and the current
state of Minnesota law does not support the court's reasoning.
In Minnesota, a plaintiff must establish that he or she possesses "a
bona fide legal interest which has been, or with respect to the ripening
seeds of a controversy is about to be, affected in a prejudicial
manner." " The key to meeting this requirement is to show that
there is an actual injury, or in the alternative, that the injury is
imminent in nature. The "injury" contemplated in the context of
Kennedy is the violation of the constitutional rights of the Fourth
District Public Defenders Office. The Fourth District Public Defenders
Office clearly met this burden in light of the findings made in this
case. If the Minnesota Supreme Court had scrutinized more thoroughly the current state of indigent defense and the associated consequences, how Minnesota law makes securing the evidence the court requires
virtually impossible, and the distinction between the relief, sought in
Kennedy and the relief that individual defendants typically seek, it
would have seen that the current state of affairs fails to guarantee an
indigent criminal defendant effective representation.

234. Id. at 6 (citing State ex rel. Smith v. Haveland, 223 Minn. 89, 92, 25 N.W.2d 474,
477 (1946)); see, e.g., St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Martizelli, 258 N.W.2d
585, 588 (1977); Beatty v. Winona Hous. and Redev. Auth., 277 Minn. 76, 85-86, 151
N.W.2d 584, 590 (1967). The Minnesota Supreme Court is not bound to federal
standing requirements even when it is considering an alleged violation of the federal
constitution. SeeAsarco, Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989). The U.S. Supreme
Court has recognized that "the constraints ofArticle III do not apply to state courts, and
accordingly the state courts are not bound by [its] limitations... [yet] they possess the
authority... to render binding judicial decisions that rest on their own interpretations
of federal law." Id.
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The Minnesota Supreme Court Incorrectly Interpreted the
PresentedFacts
The Minnesota Supreme Court misconstrued the facts in Kennedy.
First, the court's reliance on the size of the Fourth District's staff and
budget is inappropriate. The fact that the Fourth District has the
largest staff and budget is only common sense. The Fourth District,
which includes Minneapolis, has more major criminal complaints filed
than any other district in Minnesota. 5 In addition, virtually all of
the defendants in the Fourth District are indigent. 3 6 Thus, the
court's conclusion that larger means better is not convincing.
1.

Consequences Stemming from Excessive Caseloads Constitutes
ajusticiableInjury
The second difficulty which exists with the court's position is that it
characterized the State Board of Defense's caseload standards as
merely "aspirational,"5 7 therefore implying that excessive caseloads
are not indicative of the requisite injury. Such reasoning ignores the
consequences of excessive caseloads and disregards the reality in which
indigent representation takes place today.
First, there is clear evidence that excessive caseloads are crushing the
Fourth District public defenders and their ability to render effective
legal assistance. One trend in support of this conclusion is "only 2.6%
of all felony cases and less than 1% of all misdemeanors were tried" in
2.

235. WAYNE KOBBERVIG, RESEARCH AND PLANNING OFFICE, STATE CT. ADMIN., MINN.
SuP. Cr., MINN. WEIGHTED CASELOAD STUDY 1992 Appendix C (1992). Statewide, in

1992, there were 35,180 major criminal filings. Id. at 34. Major criminal filings include
all felonies, gross misdemeanor DWI, and other gross misdemeanors. Id. In the same
year there were 9,506 major criminal filings in the Fourth District. Id. at 38. This is
approximately 27% of all filings. A comparison of the crime rates found in Minnesota's
population centers also shows why the Fourth District requires more money for criminal
justice services than the rest of the State. The Duluth, Minnesota area had 421 violent
crimes and 3,817 property crimes reported in 1994. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, UNIFORM
CRIME REPORTS, CRIME IN THE U.S. 1994 85 (1995). The Rochester, Minnesota
community reported 163 violent crimes and 3,146 property crimes in the same year.
Id. at 99. In Minneapolis, there were 7,074 violent and 34,337 property crimes reported
in 1994. Id. at 94. The difference between the Fourth District and Minnesota's other
districts mirrors the national trend. In 1992, crime victimization in urban areas was
significantly higher than it was in other areas. The Bureau ofJustice Statistics reports:
People who live in rural areas-25% of the Nation's inhabitantsaccounted for about 16% of the country's violent victimizations during the
years 1987 through 1989. Moreover, rural rates of personal theft and
household crimes, such as burglary and motor vehicle theft, were at or near
the lowest level recorded since the national survey began in 1973.
2 BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, NATIONAL UPDATE 7 (1992).
236. SPANGENBERG DRAFT REPORT, supra note 11, at 34.
237. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1996).
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1991 in the Fourth District.2" This low trial rate demonstrates that
public defenders are taking fewer cases to trial since they have to
"dispose of cases without the extended time necessary for trial."" 9
The fact that Fourth District attorneys report "having over 100 open
cases" 24° at one time further illustrates how excessive caseloads are
setting the stage for a major disaster.
Second, the Fourth District public defenders' ability to provide
competent representation is highly doubtful when "[o]nly selective
2 41
investigations are ordered, many fewer than should be conducted"
and attorneys are unable to keep informed about changes in the
law.2 42 It is difficult to conclude that indigent defendants in the
Fourth District are receiving effective representation when attorneys
have to make strategic decisions based upon: (1) the time commitment
a trial will require; (2) inadequate investigations caused by a lack of
time and resources; and (3) a deficient understanding of the current
state of the law. Thus, the supreme court should have found the
requisite injury to exist.
3.

Formal Sanctions Do Not Exist for Public Defenders Even
When Incompetent Representation Clearly Occurs

Another flaw in the supreme court's reasoning is its dependence
upon the lack of civil liability or ethical sanctions to support its
conclusion.243 First, the supreme court's position is tenuous because
of its holding in Dzibuak v. Mott.2 1" In Dzibuak, the supreme court
held that public defenders "are immune from suits alleging legal
malpractice in Minnesota. "245 The Dzibuak rule consequently makes
it impossible for an indigent defendant to hold a public defender
liable for his or her inadequate representation. Not only does the
Dzibuak rule eliminate a means of redress for indigent defendants, it
also prevents the Fourth District public defenders from attaining
sufficient evidence to satisfy the supreme court.
An indigent defendant's virtual inability to raise claims of professional incompetence likewise undermines the supreme court's position.
"Rule 8 (b) of the Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility
requires the Director of the Office of Lawyers Professional Responsibili-

238. Id. at 4.

239.
240.
241.
242.

SPANGENBERG
SPANGENBERG
SPANGENBERG
SPANGENBERG

DRAFr REPORT, supra note
DRAFr REPORT, supra note
DRAFr REPORT, supra note
DRAFr REPORT, supra note

11,
11,
11,
11,

at
at
at
at

22.
34.
35.
36.

243. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Minn. 1996).
244. 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
245. Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 1 n.5 (citing Dzibuak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 773.
(Minn. 1993)).
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ty to dismiss all complaints by criminal defendants against their court
appointed counsel ....

Moreover, the fact that "[d]efendants

can only raise such claims before the district court involved in their
1 further inhibits
case"247
indigent defendants from raising professional
2
incompetence complaints. This creates a paradoxical situation.. 1
The evidence the supreme court requires will remain non-existent
because of Minnesota law and its rules of professional responsibility 2 49

Thus, the supreme court's evidentiary requirement creates a

hurdle the Fourth District Public Defenders Office cannot overcome.
Furthermore, the facts of Kennedy substantiate that the Fourth
2 50
District public defenders are not meeting their ethical obligations.
The Fourth District's public defenders find themselves unable to
conduct adequate investigations or to study changes in the law.2 5'
The American Bar Association, in promulgating standards for criminal
defense counsel, explicitly stipulates that only "[a]fter informing
himself or herself fully on the facts and the law" should counsel give
advice to his or her client. 2 2

Current conditions in the Fourth

District, as previously demonstrated,2 prevent the public defenders
from meeting their ethical obligations. The supreme court, therefore,
failed to protect the rights of the poor criminal defendant by overlooking the shoddy representation the Fourth District's public defenders
provide.
The supreme court's failure to perceive that the Fourth District
public defenders provide incompetent representation enabled the
court to make other egregious errors in judgment. One such error
occurred when the supreme court concluded that it could not rule in
favor of the Fourth District Public Defenders Office unless it shows an
actual particularized harm to an indigent defendant.

246. Id. at 6 n.5.
247. Id.
248. See Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the Wrong with Rights
We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 5-6 (1995) (noting that although criminal
defendants have more at stake than the civil defendant, "the case law generally
demonstrates so little commitment to the obligation to provide competent representation in the criminal context that it is difficult to describe legal ethics as including such
an obligation.").
249. Id. at 6. Besides the current state of the law, the fact that "[d]iscipline for
incompetence is rare and is generally reserved for the most egregious conduct--cases
involving either multiple instances of incompetence or incompetence combined with
other misconduct." Id.
250. Kennedy, 544 N.W.2d at 6.
251. SPANGENBERG DRAFT REPORT, supra note 11, at 34-36.
252.

STANDARDS

FOR CRIMINAL JuSTIcE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE

FUNCTION, 4-5.1 (a) (ABA. Standards 1993).
253. See supra notes 11, 138-42 and accompanying text.
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Actual Harm Is Not Necessary to Grant Systemic Relief

The nature of the claims made in Kennedy and the relief sought by
the Fourth District Public Defenders Office is such that the Minnesota
Supreme Court should not have demanded an actual injury to an
indigent defendant. This case is not like a traditional ineffective
assistance claim2" because the Fourth District Public Defenders
Office is not seeking post-conviction relief."'
On the contrary,
Kennedy is an attempt to secure systemic relief to avoid providing
ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 6
Although Kennedy is not a traditional ineffective assistance of counsel
257
claim, it is not a novelty either. In Luckey v. Harris,
the Eleventh
Circuit considered the question of whether, and if so how, courts may
consider systemic ineffective assistance of counsel challenges. 5 8
Plaintiffs, in the form of a class action suit representing all present and
future indigent criminal defendants in Georgia, sued the State of
Georgia under 42 U.S.C. section 1983.259 The plaintiffs asserted that
their public defenders' caseload pressures and the attorneys' inadequate resources resulted in the denial of their right to counsel. 210 In
contemplating whether the district court properly dismissed the case,
the United States Court of Appeals in the Eleventh Circuit held that
the trial court erred when it applied the Strickland test to the plaintiffs'
claims.261
Instead, the court of appeals concluded that when a
plaintiff sues seeking prospective relief he or she only needs to
establish "the likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable
injury, and the inadequacy of remedies at law."2 62 The appellate
court further reasoned that using the same standards was notjustifiable
since the relief sought in the case was not the same as that sought in
Strickland.26
The Minnesota Supreme Court was free to use the more appropriate
Luckey standard to assess the Fourth District's claims, thereby allowing
the court to rule against the State. The Fourth District Public
Defenders Office, like the plaintiffs in Luckey, were seeking relief from

254.

Kennedy v. Carlson, No. CO-95-1282, 1, 10 (D. Minn. Apr. 24, 1995) (order

granting plaintiff summary judgment).
255. Id.; Respondent's Brief at 2, Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996)
(No. CO-95-1282).
256. Respondent's Brief at 2, Kennedy (No. CO-95-1282).
257. 860 F.2d 1012 (1lth Cir.), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 957 (1988).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 1013.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1017.
262. Id. (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)).
263. Id.
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the deficiencies which presently burden it, and not individual postconviction relief for which the Supreme Court formulated StrickIand 264 Thus, it was inappropriate for the Minnesota Supreme Court
to require an actual injury to a particular indigent defendant.
In sum, the Minnesota Supreme Court should have applied the more
appropriate Luckey standard so it could have done more to preserve the
indigent defendant's rights. The supreme court possesses many
remedial options, such as providing declaratory relief or altering the
standards under which the supreme court considers ineffective
assistance of counsel claims, which it could have used to demonstrate
that it will not tolerate unfettered abrogations of an indigent's right to
counsel.
B.

DeclaratoryJudgment Is an Inadequate Remedy
The Minnesota Supreme Court could have declared that the funding
apparatus currently used by the legislature is unconstitutional. The
court then may have relied on the political processes to develop a new
funding apparatus to alleviate the funding difficulties suffered by the
state's public defenders. 5 "If the political branches view the court's
decision as legitimate, then the declaratory judgment can be an
effective tool for raising2 6funds.""
This proved true in the Kentucky
7
case of Bradshaw v. BalL

This case was the result of Kentucky's unwillingness to compensate
those attorneys ordered by the court to represent indigent defendants."s In declaring Kentucky's refusal to pay for the defense of
the indigent unconstitutional, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
recognized that the changing demands of representing the indigent
required the State to assume the obligation of paying for the defense
of the poor.269 Although the court acknowledged the need to
change how indigent defendants receive representation, the court
refused to usurp the power of the other branches of government in
order to implement its conclusion.2 70 As the Kentucky Court of

264.
265.
266.

Respondent's Brief at 11, Kennedy (No. CO-95-1282).
Citron, supra note 5, at 500.
Citron, supra note 5, at 500 (citing PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT:

CITIZENS REMEDIES FOR OFFICIAL WRONGS 151 (1983)).

267. 487 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1972).
268. Id. at 296.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 299. The court reasoned that "[t]he proper duty of the judiciary, in the

constitutionally ideal sense, is neither to enforce laws nor appropriate money. The
judiciary's reason for existence is to adjudicate." Id. This position is suspect, though,

when the court is acting to ensure the integrity of the judicial process. Id. It is role of
the court to protect the rights of a criminal defendant from all government action that
may violate his or her rights, including the lack of governmental action. Id. Because
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Appeals hoped, the legislature responded by allocating moneys to fund
the defense of indigent defendants. 7 ' Thus, it was possible for the
Minnesota Supreme Court to rely upon the other political entities to
alleviate the public defenders' funding crisis.
This approach may prove fruitless, however, considering the
circumstances at hand. First of all, a declaratory judgment does not
provide the legislature with "comprehensive and ongoing guidance in
addressing the various deficiencies needed to bring the system into
compliance with the constitution. " "' Also, there already have been
failed attempts to cure the ills of Minnesota's public defender system.
For example, the adoption of caseload standards. 75 Furthermore,
the creation of a State Board of Public Defense to lobby on the behalf
of Minnesota's public defenders has done nothing to improve the
conditions in which public defenders represent the poor. 4 In the
Fourth District Public Defenders Office's experience, in particular, the
conditions have become worse.275 Lastly, the supreme court must be
cognizant of the fact that many state legislatures have been reluctant
to provide adequate funding to defend the poor criminal defendantY6 The fact that other public defense systems are currently
suing for judicial relief substantiates this trend.27 7 If the Minnesota
of this obligation, it is sometimes inappropriate for a court to hope for legislative action.
Id.
271. Citron, supra note 5, at 500. For a more thorough discussion of how
declaratory judgments can provide indigent defense systems with more money see
generally RichardJ. Wilson, LitigativeApproaches to Enforcingthe Right to EffectiveAssistance
of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 203 (1986).
272. Citron, supra note 5, at 501.
273. Respondent's Brief at 6, Kennedy (No. CO-95-1282).
274. See Dennis Cassano, Public Defender Sues State Over Funding, STAR TRIB.
(Minneapolis), Apr. 3, 1992, at B5.
275. Randy Furst, PublicDefenderStatuteRuled Unconstitutional STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Apr. 27, 1995, at BI. "Since 1991, when the Hennepin County public defender's
office came under the jurisdiction of the state board, the number of clients has climbed
24%, to 37,155, but the number of attorneys has risen only 16%, to 86." Id.
276. Andrew Blum, Defense ofIndigents: CrisisSpurs Lawsuits, NAT'L LJ., May 15, 1995,
at Al (noting that the "decline, state by state, is relative.").
277. Id. In Indiana an attorney filed a class action suit against the state alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel stemming from the lack of state financial support and
Lake County's unwillingness to bear the burden alone. See Greg Kueterman, Lake PD
System UnderFire,IND. LAW., Sept. 6, 1995, at 1; see alsoAndrew Blum, Defense ofIndigents:
Crisis Spurs Lawsuits, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at Al (public defenders in Illinois
brought suit after they suffered a $1 million budget cut in 1992); "Overwhelming
Caseloads and Inadequate Resources", CONN. L. TRIB., Jan. 16, 1995, at 16 (Connecticut
Civil Liberties Union brought a class action alleging that Connecticut indigent defense
system violates the class members "rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, [sic] Article First, §§1, 8, 10, 12,
and 20 of the Connecticut Constitution .... ."); Song, supra note 10, at 1 (noting that
systems which appear to be successful in managing the current crisis are those using
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Supreme Court wishes to impress upon the other branches the need
to live up to their constitutional duties, the supreme court will have to
do more than issue a declaratory judgment; it has to create consequences.
Compelling Change by EndorsingConsequences: The Ideal Solution
The Minnesota Supreme Court should have fashioned a remedy to
compel the other branches of the State's government to act. There are
three potential options the Minnesota Supreme Court should have
considered.
C.

1. Allowing Public Defenders to Decline Representation When
Faced with Excessive Caseloads
One remedial alternative is to allow public defenders to petition the
trial court when their caseloads exceed set standards. California
adopted this approach in Ligda v. Superior Court of Solano County.2 78
The public defender in Ligda filed a writ of prohibition with the
Solano County Superior Court to avoid accepting a case in light of the
attorney's excessive caseload. Public defenders in California, therefore,
are now able to manage their caseloads because "[u]pon notification,
the trial court judge may begin appointing members of the private bar
until the overload situation subsides."2 79
Florida also implemented a similar remedy in Escambia County v.
Behr.2 " In Behr, a public defender's caseload proved overwhelming.
The public defender, in an attempt to secure relief from such pressure,
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court asserting that the trial court
should appoint private attorneys when the public defender surpasses
his or her caseload limit."' l The Florida Supreme Court held that a
trial court is capable of appointing a member of the private bar at its
discretion, even without a showing of a specific necessity.28 2 Thus,
as other jurisdictions have, the Minnesota Supreme Court had the
option of allowing public defenders to excuse themselves from a given
representation if the attorney's caseload is overwhelming.
Unfortunately, difficulties riddle this solution. For one reason, the

caseload standards to extract money from their respective legislatures); Lynne Tuohy,
CCLU Suit Lays Bare a Public Defense System in Crisis, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 8, 1995,
at Al (noting that the lack of legislative attention presents indigent representatives with
no other alternative than to sue the state for relief).
278. 85 Cal. Rptr. 744 (Cal. App. 1 Dist. 1970).
279.

KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 110, at 18.

280.
281.
282.

384 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 1980).
Id. at 147.
Id. at 150.
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Minnesota Supreme Court, in Dzuibak v. Mott,"'5 mandated that
public defenders cannot refuse to decline to represent indigent
criminal defendants2' and that Minnesota's public defenders are
exempt from malpractice claims."t
Allowing public defenders to
decline representation, therefore, may also subject them to malpractice
claims.2' As a result, changing a public defender's inability to refuse
to represent an indigent defendant because of overwhelming caseloads
may require the supreme court to reconsider the malpractice
exemption. 8 7 Thus, the supreme court would have to consider
overturning a holding which is only a few years old, and this is
probably an unlikely turn of events.
The Minnesota Supreme Court would also have hesitated to allow
public defenders to refuse clients in light of other potential conflicts
such a policy would create. One potential conflict involves the Fifth
Amendment's Taking Clause. 28a In the last few years, other states
considered whether requiring private attorneys to represent the poor
abrogates the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against uncompensated
taking of private property for public use. These courts have consistently concluded that the U.S. Constitution compels states to compensate
appointed private attorneys. 8 9 In Minnesota, the reserve fund
presently used in conflict of interest situations will not suffice to
alleviate the current strain the Fourth District Public Defenders Office

283. 503 N.W.2d 771 (Minn. 1993).
284. Id. at 775-76.
285. Id. at 773.
286. See Sadoff, supra note 121, at 909-14 (describing the manner in which a
malpractice claim is brought and what a sensible standard of review is for attorneys who
represent the indigent).
287. See Rutherford, supra note 70, at 1000 (arguing that absolute immunity is
inappropriate and unfairly denies wronged criminal defendants a legitimate means of
redress).
288.

KLEIN & SPANGENBERG, supra note 110, at 18; U.S. CONST. amend. V. The

relevant portion of the Fifth Amendment states that "nor shall private property be taken
for public use, without just compensation." Id.
289. See, e.g., Arnold v. Kemp, 813 S.W.2d 770, 774 (Ark. 1992) (concluding that
assigned counsel system violates Fifth Amendment due process protections "when an
attorney is required to spend an unreasonable amount of time on indigent appointments so that there is a genuine and substantial interference with his or her private
practice."); State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150, 1156-57 (Okla. 1990) (finding maximum cap
of $3,200 for services rendered to be a violation of due process under the federal
constitution); State v. Ryan, 44 N.W.2d 656, 660 (Neb. 1989) (holding that the attorney
is entitled to compensation for court connected hours. . . spent researching law and
investigating the prosecution's case); State ex. rel Stephen v. Smith, 747 P.2d 816, 84042 (Kan. 1987) (concluding that "the responsibility to provide the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel is a public responsibility that is not to be borne entirely by the private
bar.").
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presently experiences.2
Therefore, the most appropriate option is
to craft a remedy which compels the legislature to amend the current
indigent defense system rather than to continue sidestepping the fact
that public defenders need more legislative support to do an adequate
job.
2.

Compelling Relief by Implementing a Presumption of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
This sort of compulsive relief is also not an untested idea. One of
the first challenges to the adequacy of an indigent defense system
arose in the context of State v. Smith.2 1 At the time of Smith's
prosecution for burglary and rape, Mohave County, Arizona, used an
assigned counsel system to represent its indigent criminal defendants. 2 91 2 In deciding which attorneys to appoint to its criminal cases,

Mohave County government officials relied primarily upon one
criterion: cost.2 93 On appeal Smith argued that the system which
assigned his attorney to him unconstitutionally allowed conditions to
exist that led to Smith receiving ineffective legal assistance.' 4 The
court agreed, and therefore held that Mohave County's method of
assigning counsel harbored too many faults to garner judicial
support.2 95 The Arizona Supreme Court found the assigned counsel
system was unconstitutional since it did not properly allocate sufficient
funds to provide enough time for attorneys to prepare their cases.296
The Arizona Supreme Court further held that Mohave County's
system was faulty since it did not account for the fact that it is
impossible to predict the complexity of a case. 97 Most importantly,
the Arizona Supreme Court recognized the consequences of allowing
29
an overburdened attorney to represent an indigent defendant.
The court reasoned that "[t] he insidiousness of overburdening defense

290. See supra notes 193-96 (Hennepin County public defenders' attack of statutory
reserve fund).
291. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374 (Ariz. 1984). For a thorough discussion of this
decision and its impact on Strickland's rationale, see generally Suzanne E. Mounts, The
Right to Counsel and the Indigent Defense System, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 221
(1986).
292. Smith, 681 P.2d at 1379.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 1378. The root of Smith's allegation was that his "attorney spent only two
to three hours interviewing the defendant and 'possibly' six to eight hours studying the
case because of the attorney's shocking, staggering and unworkable caseload." Id. at
1378-79.
295. Id. at 1381.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. Id.
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counsel is that it can result in concealing from the courts... the
nature and extent of damage that is done to defendants by their
attorneys' excessive caseloads.""
The Arizona Supreme Court, however, did not stop with declaring
Mohave County's practices unconstitutional.3s° It also reinforced its
disdain for Mohave County's procedures by electing to modify the way
in which it reviewed ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 01 The
court held that "there will be an inference that the procedure resulted
in ineffective assistance of counsel, which inference the state will have
the burden of rebutting.""0' Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court
impressed upon the county governments in Arizona that it is unwilling
to allow the counties' cost saving mentality to infringe upon a poor
person's constitutional entitlements.305
The Minnesota Supreme Court could have adopted the Smith
standard and communicated a similar message to its own legislature.s ' The Smith standard would have compelled the legislature to
re-evaluate and modify Minnesota's public defender system. It is
evident that the Fourth District's prosecutors are currently incapable
of meeting the burden of the Smith standard considering the circumstances that pervade the Fourth District. The legislature, therefore,
would have had to quickly respond to avoid paralyzing the State's
ability to attain convictions. In sum, the Minnesota Supreme Court
could have compelled the legislature to grant Minnesota's public
defenders relief.
Another alternative available to the Minnesota Supreme Court was
to adopt the measures formulated by the Louisiana Supreme Court in
State v. Peart.'5 The city of New Orleans operated a public defender
system."° During the prosecution of Peart for a host of violent
crimes, the public defender representing Peart filed a "Motion for
Relief to Provide Constitutionally Mandated Protection and Resourc-

299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 1384.
302. Id.
303. See Citron, supra note 5, at 502.
304. The Minnesota Supreme Court attempts to rely on the egregious facts
surrounding Smith to conclude that the Fourth District public defenders' claims are
meritless. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1996). This is inappropriate,
though, considering that Smith was a post-conviction challenge whereas Kennedy is a
systemic challenge. Thus, the circumstances that constitute the requisite injury are
different and a comparison of the two is of little value.
305. 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
306. Id. at 785.
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es." 0 7 After a series of hearings, the trial court concluded that the
public defender was unable to render effective assistance of counsel."'8 The trial judge reached this conclusion in light of the fact
that the attorney was managing seventy felony cases and had a case set
for trial every day for the first eight months of the year." The trial
judge also concluded that the public defender system itself was grossly
inadequate due to the lack of investigators and the unavailability of any
expert testimony 1 0 The trial court thus ordered the legislature to
grant additional funding to the public defender system so it could
secure desperately needed resources.1
In ruling upon the State's appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court
reversed the trial court's order.3 2 It instead elected to fashion its
own remedy in an exercise of its "general supervisory jurisdiction over
all other courts."3 13 The court held that, since the lack of indigent
defense funding eradicated the possibility of inadequate assistance by
an attorney in the district in question "a rebuttable presumption arises
that indigents... are receiving assistance of counsel not sufficiently
effective to meet constitutionally required standards." 314 The court
further held that the trial court, upon a defendant's motion, must hold
a hearing to determine whether the indigent's representative is
denying the defendant his right to effective counsel. 13 If the trial
court finds a lack of effective assistance, then the trial court must
attempt to fashion a remedy or prevent the prosecution from
proceeding until the attorney can render effective assistance. 16
Certainly Minnesota's trial courts are capable of hearing similar
motions and conducting any necessary hearings on the matter. Thus,
the Minnesota Supreme Court should have considered implementing
this remedy to alleviate the conditions existing in the Fourth District.
Just as in State v. Smith, however, there is a limit to the presumption

of ineffective assistance of counsel. 1 7 The Louisiana Supreme Court

307. Id. at 784. The public defender in this case, Rick Teisser, represented Peart
in defending himself against charges of armed robbery, aggravated rape, aggravated
burglary, and attempted armed robbery. Teisser was one of only two attorneys assigned
to represent indigent defendants. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 784-85.
312. Id. at 792; LouisianaSupreme CourtBlocks Indigent DefenderFundingOrder, BATON
ROUGE ADvOC., Feb. 21, 1992, at 7B.
313. Id. at 790 (citing LA. CONST. art. V, § 5).
314. Id. at 791.
315. Id. at 791-92.
316. Id. at 792.
317. Id. at 791.
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held that this presumption shall remain in place until there are
significant changes in New Orleans' public defender system.31 8 The
court went further to reinforce its position on the matter, prophesizing
that:
If legislative action is not forthcoming and indigent defense reform
does not take place, this Court, in the exercise of its constitutional

and inherent power and supervisory jurisdiction, may find it
necessary to employ the more intrusive and specific measures it has

thus far avoided to ensure that indigent defendants receive reasonably effective assistance of counsel. 19
Thus, not only did the Louisiana Supreme Court provide a method of
pre-trial relief, it also defined what changes were necessary so the
legislature would know what aspects of its public defender system
needed change. Peart, like Smith, demonstrates that the Minnesota
Supreme Court is in a position to provide a remedy to force the
legislature to act.
The Minnesota Supreme Court should have found the Peartremedy
a very attractive option. While the declaratory judgment reiterates the
3 20
court's position, it does little to compel the legislature to act.

Furthermore, allowing trial courts to appoint private attorneys will
result in more lawsuits321 and will conflict with existing precedent.3 1

On the other hand, relief that alters how the judicial system

views an indigent defense system is surely to produce the desired
results.
Within this type of remedy, the court will be able to act if it
concludes that the legislature did not heed its warning.323 Dismissing
a prosecutor's case or overturning a conviction would undoubtedly
capture the legislature's attention. The court's proactive relief,
therefore, would have the effect of penalizing "the state for its
inadequate indigent defense institutions by making convictions more
difficult to obtain until the system [is] reformed."3 2 4 Surely the
threat of releasing criminals will grab the media's, and ultimately the
public's, attention.2 3 Moreover, the legislature's fear of appearing
to condone the release of criminals will certainly compel it to act.

318.

Id. The court did not precisely define what it meant by "changes." Instead, it

merely eluded that the attorney's workload in place at the time of the ruling would

have to change. It is important to note that this rebuttable presumption only reached
the district reviewed in the case, and not the entire state. Id.
319. Id.
320. Citron, supra note 5, at 500.

321. See KLEiN & SPANGE.NBERG, supra note 110, at 17-19.
322. See Dzibuak v. Mott, 503 N.W.2d 771, 775 (Minn. 1993).
323. Citron, supra note 5, at 502.

324. Id.
325. Id.
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Hence, a remedy that incorporates a rebuttable presumption similar
to those found in Smith and Peart is an attractive option, one the
Minnesota Supreme Court should have implemented.
Furthermore, the ability of the court to implement a remedy to
alleviate current conditions while not declaring section 611.27,
subdivision 7 unconstitutional demonstrates the flexibility of the Smith
and Peart rebuttable presumption option. 26 The court could have,
as the Louisiana Supreme Court did in Peart,ruled that the statutory
funding apparatus is constitutional but the inadequate level of funding
creates intolerable conditions.31 In sum, the Minnesota Supreme
Court needs to formulate and order a remedy which forces the state's
legislature to address its indigent defense system's deficiencies.
3.

Forcingthe Legislature to Respond by Heightening the Level of
Scrutiny Given to Claims of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
A third alternative available to the Minnesota Supreme Court is the
option of becoming more critical of counsel's performance at the trial
court level.8 28 This can be accomplished if the court elects to
implement a new standard for assessing post-conviction ineffective
assistance of counsel claims. A survey of other states reveals that
abandoning the Strickland test is a viable possibility.
The Supreme Court of Hawaii, for example, concluded in Briones v.
State5' that it is more appropriate to apply a "stricter review of
counsel's performance to the appellate stage in order to more fully
protect the defendants' rights ... ."30

It therefore adopted an

326. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780, 791 (La. 1993).
327. Id. It is also necessary to observe that the Minnesota Supreme Court, like the
Louisiana Supreme Court did in Pear, could have implemented a rebuttable
presumption in the Fourth District alone and not throughout the entire state. See id.
at 792.
328. See id. at 791.
329. 848 P.2d 966 (Haw. 1993).
330. Id. at 976. The court explicitly rejected Strickland's test as "too burdensome for
defendants to meet because it imposes a double burden upon defendants trying to show
their counsel's ineffective assistance, resulting in a prejudice requirement almost
impossible to surmount." &d.at 976 n.l1 (citing State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 500 n.7
(1986)). In reaching the same conclusion as the Hawaii Supreme Court, other
commentators have argued for implementing a modified Strickland standard. The
proposals consist of the following:
The modified Strickland standard initially requires a showing of a reasonable
probability that the appointed counsel will commit unprofessional errors at
trial. Such a showing creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant will
be prejudiced, and therefore, an inference that the defendant is not receiving
effective assistance of counsel. The trial must, nevertheless, proceed in order
to preserve the defendant's right to a speedy trial and foster the public's
interest in the swift administration of our nation's system of criminal justice.
However, all convictions should be subject to reversal unless the state can
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objectively reasonable test."'1
This test holds that if it is not possible to justify an act or omission,
and the act or omission impacted a possibly meritorious claim, "then
the knowledge held and investigation performed by counsel... will be
evaluated as that information that, in light of the complexity of the law
and the factual circumstances, an ordinarily competent criminal
attorney should have had.""3 ' Thus, this standard is less restrictive
than Strickland because it does not require a showing of actual
prejudice."' 3
Breese v. Commonwealth,3M provides another example of a possible

test the supreme court could have used. In Breese, the Supreme Court
of Massachusetts adopted a similar reasonable attorney standard which
requires a reviewing court when assessing an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim to determine "whether there has been serious incompetency, inefficiency, or inattention of counsel ... and, if that is found,
then ... whether it has likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise
available, substantial ground of defence."3 5 The Minnesota Supreme
Court, therefore, could have adopted a similar standard to provide
indigent defendants more protection against errors caused by
overburdened public defenders.3 6 Moreover, the capability of
implementing a more stringent review of a public defender's conduct
further supports the selection of a remedy which compels the
legislature to act.
In summary, the Minnesota Supreme Court expressed that it may

demonstrate that the appointed attorney's acts or omissions were either
harmless or justified. To prove that an allegedly ineffective act or omission

was justified, the government must:
produce actual evidence, from the record or otherwise, that
defense counsel made a reasonable tactical decision under the
particular circumstances of the defendant's case and that this
decision justified his failure to substantially satisfy one or more

of the basic components [of effective representation].
Charles M. Kreamer, Adjudicatingthe Peart Motion: A Proposed Standard to Protect the Right
to Effective Assistance of Counsel Prmpectively, 39 LOY. L. REV. 635, 653-55 (1993) (quoting
Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-Based Standardfor
EvaluatingIneffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. LJ. 413, 441 (1988) (alteration

in original)).
331.

Briones v. State, 848 P.2d 966, 976 (Haw. 1993).

332. Id.
333. Id. at 977.
334. 612 N.E.2d 1170 (Mass. 1993).

335. Id. at 1172.
336. See Rutherford, supra note 70, at 977. As part of the argument to abandon
absolute immunity for public defenders, Rutherford argues that the court should modify
Strickland by eliminating the presumption of effectiveness element from the test. Id. at
1006-08. This is another viable alternative that the court should consider. In short, the
court can remedy this problem; it just needs to be willing to do so.
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make itself amenable to this standard when it stated that it "is
altogether fitting that our constitution be interpreted by this state's
highest court to offer greater safeguards of fundamental rights for
Minnesota citizens than the protection offered citizens of the United
States under the federal constitution."3 7 If the court had chosen to
order just a declaratory judgment, it would not have successfully
convinced the legislature to act.'3 8 Thus, the capability to compel
legislative action and the ability to enforce its warnings makes
implementing a rebuttable presumption of ineffective assistance of
counsel or altering the post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel
claims the superior remedies.
VII.

CONCLUSION

Kennedy v. Carlson provides a window for the world to view how many
indigent defense systems are currently operating in the United States.
The fact of the matter is that politicians, with their pro-law enforcement mentality, are crippling the poor's ability to secure adequate
counsel. This trend debases the very virtues the entire judicial system
represents; due process, equal treatment, and blind justice all become
hollow promises for a poor person represented by today's public
defender. This results because the public defender system is an
institution which is neither politically popular nor always viewed as
essential by the public. Unfortunately, if the court does nothing, things
are only going to become worse.
Kennedy provided the Minnesota Supreme Court with an invitation
to change this pattern of legislative insubordination. The premise is
simple: public defenders cannot represent the poor effectively until the
legislature provides the requisite resources. The Minnesota Supreme
Court should have become the messenger and delivered to the rest of
the state's government a message: the judicial system will not tolerate
the transformation of a process that is supposedly adversarial in nature
into a rubber stamp adjudication process. Furthermore, the Minnesota
Supreme Court should have demonstrated that the rest of the
government cannot ignore its message.
The court could have
accomplished this by implementing a remedy that will surely garner a
legislative response to the current crisis. Although this solution may
cause more of a burden on the State, the State created the current
crisis and it, not the poor criminal defendant, should bear the burden

337. Friedman v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828, 836 (Minn. 1991).
The court could expand greater protection to Minnesotans under Article 1, § 6 of
Minnesota's Constitution. It states that a defendant "shall enjoy the right ...to have
the assistance of counsel in his defense." MINN. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
338.

See Citron, supra note 5, at 500.
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of its failings. A remedial measure with teeth would have started
transforming Minnesota's public defender system from a beleaguered
institution into one that guarantees effective assistance of counsel to all
indigent defendants.
David L. Wilson
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